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Abstract 
 
This project sought to identify the presence of biases in the Ghanaian political system, in order to 
define and explain the possible polarization existing within the country, and its consequences on 
the country‟s political progress. This project involved research in Ghana, conducted in a 3 week 
period between December 2010 and January 2011, to test the hypothesis that biases were present 
within the local population and the cause of dangerous (rebellion-prompting) polarization within 
the population. The biases anticipated were motivated bias, explicitly „myside‟ biases in the form 
of selective exposure, belief overkill, and biased assimilation/polarization. The research method 
was the use of an orally administered questionnaire to suit the needs of the population. It was 
found that there exists polarization within the country, though not an extreme polarization of the 
sort that would forewarn of revolution. These results are significant in that they help us 
understand the current Ghanaian political climate and the actions of its people.  
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Overview 
 
Ghana is a country located on the western coast of Africa, bordered by Togo, Burkina Faso and 
the Ivory Coast. It gained its independence from British colonial rule on 6th march 1957 and has 
fluctuated between democratic, socialist and authoritarian rule in the first 35 years of its 
independence; since 1992, Ghana has been recognized as a constitutional democracy. Its capital 
is Accra, located in the Greater Accra Region, which together with the nine other regions, the 
Western Region, the Eastern Region, the Central Region, the Ashanti Region, the Volta Region, 
the Brong Ahafo Region, the Northern Region, the Upper East Region and the Upper West 
Region, segment the country. The Ghanaian population stands at 23,382,848 (World Bank 2009 
Consensus), with the major peoples being the Akan 45.3%, Mole-Dagbon 15.2%, Ewe 11.7%, 
Ga-Dangme 7.3%, other 20.4% (2000 census).   
 
Ghana, politically, is officially characterized as a multiparty state, having 8 political parties that 
run for presidential and parliamentary elections. Nonetheless, acting in accordance with 
Duvergers law
1
, two main parties have emerged that dominate the Ghanaian political scene. That 
is, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the National Patriotic Party (NPP), who 
received together 97% of the total vote in the first round of the 2008 presidential election; only 
candidates from these two parties have served in presidential office in the 16 years (4 elections) 
since return to constitutional democracy; at present, the current head of state is Professor John 
Atta Mills of the NDC party. Given this, the research treats Ghana as though it was a two-party 
democratic system, and examines it in light of the expectations anticipated within such a system.  
      
Though some differences may be noted, Ghanaian history and politics follow the general plot of 
African politics in general. Ghana, like many other African countries, can be characterized as a 
clientelist state. Here, party leaders have relied on individuals who already possessed 
considerable local followings, by binding them to their party with promises of riches and other 
benefits and in effect, buy their committed local supporters from a trusted middleman. In this 
way, voters have come to look to well-known, trusted candidates, who promise material benefits 
                                               
1
 Duverger Maurice, Political Parties, University Printing House, Cambridge, 1976 
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such as access to infrastructure and social amenities, while these candidates turn to party leaders 
for personal benefits such as cash, land or credit, when parties gain access to these private and 
public resources in office. As such, African politics became the amassing of private and public 
resources, rather than the building of trust within the populace, as politicians sought to buy the 
vote, rather than earn it. As parties came to power, they worked to withhold these public 
resources from their opposition, resulting in jealousy and contention that led to battles for control 
of resources, in order to manipulate power; this corrupted democratic rule and led to civil strife, 
military rule, and dictatorships. Ghana, luckily after 35 years of such turmoil, was able to pull 
itself out of this cycle and return to democratic constitutional rule; nonetheless, clientelism still 
exists within the system.          
 
The significance of clientelism is found in the existing polarization that this research seeks to 
explore. It is clientelism that allows for the promotion of ethnocentrism and regionalism, as 
parties have aligned themselves with well-known individuals in particular regions and 
ethnicities. These promoted and preserved divisions reappear in democratic elections, as parties 
continue to appeal to old sources of support and voters; understanding the clientelist state they 
live in, voters continue to sell their vote to „trusted‟ buyers. „Trusted‟ in the sense that, these 
candidates are expected to be corrupt and think only of their pockets, nonetheless, should redirect 
some small portion of those benefits they receive, in some form, to the people, if the people are 
members of their clientele (ethnic group/ local community). Moreover, to allow a politician who 
maintains a different set of clients (a different or rival ethnic group/ local community) access to 
these public resources appears imprudent. In this way, alignment with one party naturally leads 
to the rejection of the other: division and polarization. 
 
The 2008 election revealed these divisions in the Ghanaian population; the expectation was for 
half the population to rejoice when election results were announced, while the other half 
mourned and rebelled. This paper would use biases to identify the existence of polarization and 
alignment within the Ghanaian population, which could be understood by the historic, and 
presently continuing nature and functioning of clientelism in the country. The biases sought were 
motivated bias, explicitly „myside‟ biases in the form of selective exposure, belief overkill, and 
biased assimilation/polarization; Selective Exposure is seen in a situation where individuals 
6 
 
strongly prefer their party-aligned media to others, Belief Overkill is the denial of the objective 
truth or a show of stubborn preference, while Biased Assimilation is seen when neutral or weak 
evidence is used to bolster pre-existing belief. These biases inherently tell the alignment of 
voters by expressing their preference or disillusion with one or the other.  
 
The research conducted found that there exists a type of polarization within the country, though 
not an extreme polarization of the sort that would forewarn of revolution. This was seen in the 
inverse relationship between support for one of the two dominant parties and the opposition of 
the other party among subjects. Moreover, the lack of identifiable biases in some subjects also 
reflects the middle ground in the Ghanaian population, given the 20-40% estimate of floating 
voters (27.27% identified in the research). In addition, correlations in popularly believed political 
biases in the population corresponded with the political bias identified, while the barely 
significant ethnic biases correlated with convictions that there was a declining ethnic bias in the 
country. These results allow us to note the polarization within the state, understand its limitations 
(not enough to lead to civil strife), and its believed decline. This helps us understand why, 
despite questionable policies and the deteriorating economic environment during each party‟s 
term of office, the same individuals consistently support them. 
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Introduction 
Ghana‟s fifth election since return to multiparty democracy revealed a notable division within 
the Ghanaian populace. The 7
th
 December 2008 election resulted in none of the eight candidates 
for the presidency receiving a majority of the votes needed to take office; as such, the Electoral 
Commission announced a runoff between Nana Akufo-Addo of the National Patriotic Party 
(NPP) and John Atta Mills of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the two dominant 
parties within the country. The NPP candidate had received 49.13 % of the votes cast on cast 7
th
 
December, while the NDC candidate received 47.92 % of the votes. This second round was 
conducted on the 28
th
 of December 2008, with the final outcome of the Run-off election resulting 
in the declaration that the President-elect was John Atta Mills (NDC) with 50.23 % of the votes.
2
 
Such a close victory, with a differential of only .23%, could lead one to believe that there exists a 
high level of Polarization within the Ghanaian population, and merits a closer look.  
Polarization is an interesting occurrence because it can imply two political situations with 
different implication for a country and its government. To be explicit, polarization speaks of a 
situation in which we see an even split in voter‟s preference between two political 
candidates/parties in a two-party democratic system. But a 50:50 voting preference speaks to the 
fact that individuals equally like, dislike or are indifferent between the candidates they must vote 
between. Given this, even in a situation where a 50:50 preference towards political candidates is 
shown, one cannot immediately assume that the nation is polarized. Polarization is shown only in 
the case where individuals show an extreme liking for one party and a correlated extreme 
opposition to the other party, in a two-party democratic state. If the people are simply 
disillusioned with the political process or indifferent between the candidates, then one cannot say 
there exists a deeply divided population, and hence, speak of polarization. In Ghana, the 2008 
election revealed this near 50:50 divisions within the nation, especially with regards to the 
election of the country‟s president. Now, one is led to ask if Ghana is a case of polarization, a 
deeply divided and committed block of partisans on opposite ends of a two-party political 
spectrum; or if the population simply displayed their indifference (like/dislike of both political 
                                               
2Ghanaweb, “Prof Mills Wins Presidential Runoff Elections” 
<http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/election2008/presidential2.php> 
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candidates) or disillusionment with the Ghanaian political system (corruption-based aversion of 
both political candidates)  in the 2008 election.  
This question is important because of the possibility of a collapse of democracy and the 
instigation of revolution in a polarized state. In thinking of Polarization within a country, one is 
led to the ideas of culture wars. To illustrate this, we may look to the United States as an 
example of a polarized nation. Sociologist James Hunter divided Americans into the culturally 
“orthodox” and the culturally “progressive,” by which he meant that contemporary American 
voters are deeply divided on moral issues. Hunter tells us that this would inevitably lead to 
increasing conflict between the two groups. From this we gather that, close elections reflect 
evenly matched blocs of deeply committed partisans, who could at any moment engage each the 
other in violent wars. This situation can be expected if an electorate is highly polarized with a 
large number of “progressives” on the left supporting the Democrats (in the case of Ghana, the 
National Democratic Congress (NDC)), and a large number of “orthodox” on the right 
supporting the Republicans (in the case of Ghana, the National Patriotic Party (NPP)), and very 
few people occupy the middle ground.  This produces the 50:50 (Graphic U-shape)
3
 results that 
could lead to revolution. On the other hand, one may have a case where most people hold 
moderate or centrist positions, and relatively few are extreme partisans. In this case, The NDC 
and the NPP parties position themselves equidistant from the center on opposite sides, producing 
the same 50:50 results (Graphic Inverse U-shape)
4
. In the first instance, you have the population 
being closely divided but deeply divided (polarized), while in the second; they are closely 
divided but not deeply divided (indifferent/disillusioned). In the 2008 election in Ghana, 
individuals were concerned, fearful, that the country would break out into war. In the capital city 
of Accra, shops were closed at midday in anticipation of the announcement of the elections 
results and the ensuing violence that would follow. This expectation of revolt suggests that there 
exist deep divisions within the country‟s population, hence a dangerous polarization which 
threatens the very concept of democracy and stability in the country: the voices of the people 
were divided. 
5
   
                                               
3
 See appendix C 
4
 See appendix C 
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The purpose of this project is to provide a credible hypothesis that accounts for the existence of a 
non-traditional, polarized state in Ghana. I use the term „non-traditional‟ because, as I will 
explain in this paper, the various traditional models and concepts used in assessing a polarized 
state in political science currently fail to adequately account for the situation in Ghana. 
Explicitly, the questions I seek to address here are the various contradictions that arise when a 
traditional method of thought is applied to the Ghanaian situation. To illustrate, one may 
question: why did extremist choose not to abstain, but rather participate in the election, if one 
would anticipate that, given their position on the political spectrum, they would be too disgusted 
at parties compromising on their policies (moving to the center) to engage in the political 
process? Why were parties certain that they will not see this abstention of extremist votes and 
hence be forced to keep away from the center and uphold their divergent socialist and 
conservative standpoints? Though revolution was anticipated at the end of the 2008 election, 
why did democratic government continue to function? Though a government chosen from one 
end of the political spectrum is expected to fail to please a large section of the population, why 
has this „good breeding grounds for revolution‟6 gone unexploited? Moreover, regarding the 
distribution of voters along the political scale, given the predominant social class being the lower 
class, with no sizable middle class and a small upper class, why was the margin of the left-wing 
vote only .23%?  These questions seek to address an apparent failure in the logic of the existing 
political apparatus to address the inconsistencies in the 2008 Ghanaian election. The responses to 
these questions, I propose, are found in the fact that most Ghanaians ignore the ideological basis 
and policy initiatives of the major parties, and rather vote on historically formulated biases or 
ethnic ties maintained by the clientelist state. The research conducted in Ghana was to identify if 
there was an existing bias within population at large to provide evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that this was the underlying factor that determined how individuals cast their vote.   
                                               
6
 Fiorina M. P., Abrams S. J., Pope J. C., “Culture War?: The Myth of a Polarized America” 
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Introduction 
The 2008 election revealed the possible existence of a dangerous type of Polarization in the 
Ghanaian population; the expectation was for half the population to rejoice when election results 
were announced, while the other half mourned and rebelled. This conclusion spurred the research 
that this paper explores. To fully understand the results that the experiments produced, it is 
necessary that one have an understanding of polarization theory, and the African political 
landscape, with specific emphasis on the Ghanaian political landscape. In this section, I will 
provide the necessary background for the experiment and discussion to follow. 
 
Polarization and My Hypothesis 
First, note that Polarization implies a failure of the democratic system to adequately address the 
needs of a populace. Anthony Downs, in discussing the statistics and dynamics of party 
ideologies in “An Economic Theory of Democracy,” speaks of the failure of a two-party 
democratic system to provide stable and effective government except in the case of ideological 
consensus among its citizens. Ideology, Downs tells us, is not created for the sake of 
forming/promoting a better society, but rather is a weapon in the struggle for office. He makes 
the point that, due to uncertainty, widely varying ideologies may be employed by political parties 
when these parties are motivated solely by the desire to maximize votes. Ideologies can be used 
in this way because many rational voters tend to take shortcuts in choosing a party, by deciding 
to vote ideologically instead of comparing party policies and platforms. They do this on the 
assumption that the party ideology is reflected in the party platform and as such need only 
examine the former and ignore the latter. Nonetheless, for voters to be assured in this strategy, 
political parties, in formulating strategy, must keep to this expectation (matching ideology and 
policy) or stand the risk of losing credibility. As such, the competitive struggle for office 
compels parties to be both honest and consistent in creating platforms and ideologies and 
developing them over time. (Downs, A. (1957)) Despite the compelling argument the Downs 
makes, the majority of the Ghanaian population ignores party ideology and platforms altogether, 
and rather focuses on ethnicity and history as the basis on which they select their government.  
One may question on what basis the claim is made that the Ghanaian population ignores 
ideology and party platforms altogether. In addressing this question, we first look at the ideology 
and party platforms that each party upholds and the Ghanaian response; by so doing, we can 
12 
 
assess if the parties have kept to their platforms and if the population has reacted as Down‟s 
predicts, and as such, we can determine if ideology plays a significant role in the Ghanaian 
voters‟ choices. 
 
Party Ideology and Policies detailed 
From its early beginnings, the National Patriotic Party (NPP) has always upheld, as dictated by 
its manifesto, that a viable democracy can be created and maintained in a liberal democratic state 
with a market economy and free enterprise. This state, they asserted, should be created in an 
atmosphere where the individual is confident and assured of his or her basic human rights and 
freedoms, free speech, free association, free movement and lawful actions. For the NPP, this 
confidence is only possible where there is rule of law and respect of it, not only by the governed 
but also, above all, by the government.  The National Democratic Congress, on the other hand, is 
recognized as a social democratic party, and a recent member of the „Socialist International‟ 
political alliance. From its beginning, as obtained from its manifesto, the NDC similarly pledged 
to work towards making the most basic human rights – food, shelter, education, medical care, 
work, the opportunity to live and develop in peace and dignity, accessible to all Ghanaians. The 
NDC also pledged to uphold the human rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution of the 
Fourth Republic, particularly the rights to life, property, speech, association, personal liberty and 
freedom of the press.  (Ephson Ben, 1992) The difference between the two then lies in the fact 
that, while the NPP believes that there must always be a credible alternative government 
(opposition parties serving as a check on government) to maintain the accountability needed to 
create the liberal democracy it envisions, the NDC takes a different, centralist approach to 
accountability, insisting that the rights and freedoms of powerful or influential individuals must 
not be permitted to threaten the rights of the disadvantaged in society. For this reason, the NDC 
sees the need to enforce accountability (since there are always some individuals who would be 
irresponsible, corrupt or incompetent) by strengthening the machinery for dealing with lapses in 
accountability and requiring the highest standards of conduct of office-holders. (Ephson, 1992) 
In this way, the NDC holds fast to its foundations based on Provisional National Defense 
Council (PNDC) military rule in Ghana from 1981-1991. 
With regards to the economy, both parties take a different approach to economic development.  
The National Patriotic Party (NPP) aims to concede freedom to the private sector. Its government 
13 
 
aims to create the conditions that allow the private sector free rein. The role of the state in the 
economic area is to be re-directed and focused on the provisions of the facilities needed to 
promote the enterprise culture. In this vein, the NPP encourages the development of strong, 
independent and responsible associations like trade unions, professional bodies and religious 
organizations. It is seeks to ensure that trade unions and other trade and professional associations 
do not become appendages to ruling parties. In place of controls, administrative allocations, or 
any socialist-type dirigisme, the NPP is committed to free enterprise in partnership, as the mode 
of economic organization. The National Democratic Congress (NDC) on the other hand takes a 
more centralist approach, but is committed to creating the conditions for enterprise to grow, in an 
atmosphere of confidence and partnership with government. For this reason, it aims to restrain 
the public sector from undertaking activities better reserved for the private sector, while ensuring 
that, by so doing, unemployment is neither created nor essential services withdrawn. The NDC, 
given this approach, seeks to maintain product fiscal policy, enabling reductions in the individual 
tax burden as well as providing corporate bodies with incentives to invest. The NDC promises to 
pay critical attention to encouraging long term lending to local business through appropriate 
guarantee schemes and refinancing of the banking system in respect of credit extension to 
strategic sectors. In this way, the NDC aims to maintain a strict balance between the public 
sector and the private sector in defining enterprise, while the NPP advocates for free enterprise 
and policies to that extent. (Ephson, 1992)   
 
More recently, the policies of the two parties have diverged more distinctly than before. The 
National Patriotic Party (NPP) has become committed to the goal of a radical acceleration of 
Ghana‟s capacity to create wealth, and as such supply the means for a much higher standard of 
welfare development. One project implemented to ensure this goal is manpower development to 
create an army of skilled people. As such, the NPP government has developed and promoted far-
reaching reforms in the quality and availability of educational opportunities for all Ghanaians. 
Another project with this aim is the new strategy of micro-economic interventions for facilitating 
private sector operations, including modernized farming and fisheries, to lead the nation into 
unprecedented engagement in wealth creation. This, the NPP believes would be achieved 
through focusing business intervention in growth areas of ICT applications, agro-processing, 
other value-addition ventures and Tourism. All this would be achieved easily in a nation of 
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healthy workers, well-motivated to give of their best in production and service activities. As such 
the NPP also advocates a more humane health delivery system to be provided through effective 
implementation and geographical spread of the National Health Insurance Scheme. All these 
would lead to the successful attainment of accelerated economic growth which should lead to 
accelerated improvement in the living conditions of the people of Ghana. (NPP, 2010) 
 
Meanwhile, The National Democratic Congress (NDC) has taken up the mantra of Social 
Democracy, by which they advocate “a belief in the equality and egalitarian treatment of all 
persons with respect to their political, economic, social, cultural and religious relations in a 
multi-party, multi ethnic environment. By this they also make the commitment to progressive 
politics and the protection of the under-privileged and the upliftment of the socially 
disadvantaged”. Instead of wealth creation as an approach to redress the country‟s low living 
standards, the NDC looks to the advancement of the vast majority of Ghanaians by taking 
seriously the issues of education, health, sanitation, water, housing and poverty alleviation. For 
the NDC, “social democracy” imposes on them the responsibility to provide to Ghanaians the 
basic amenities of life at affordable costs and guarantee employment to those who are willing 
and able to work. The objective of the NDC is the creation of a sound foundation for generations 
to come, in community responsibility through strengthening and expanding each one‟s 
contribution to the various units of governance and institutions that deliver social justice, fair 
play, and guarantee that each citizen obtains the benefit of his or her labor. In this way, the NPP 
and NDC, though promising the same things, approach their attainment with different focuses, 
highlighting wealth-creation and social equity respectively. (NDC, 2008) 
 
Having looked at these policies, we may ask, given the distinctions, what the basis of saying 
individuals ignores these differing approaches to welfare augmentation by the different parties 
when they cast their votes. The question asked here is not adequately addressed by stating that 
the average Ghanaian on the street, when asked what the differences between the major parties 
policies would provide no suitable or convincing answer. So in supporting this claim then, one 
should look to African politics in general, and the broad expectations of the African citizen with 
regards to politicians in answering this question. 
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African Politics and the Clientelist State explained 
Chris Allen in his work, Understanding African Politics, 1995 , examines the internal dynamics 
of African politics that led to the creation of clientelist/neo-patrimonial states that exists in many 
African states. The first thing to note was that decolonization was a hasty affair; one could say 
that the imperialist governments within Africa were suddenly caught in a strong, rising wave for 
independence and succumbed to it in a disordered manner. As such, „elections were introduced 
with little notice… requiring nationalist organizations to mobilize huge new electorates in a very 
short time‟ (Chris Allen: 1995) Allen identified two strategies for party building that marked 
winning candidates campaigns; the first was „reliance on individuals who already had 
considerable local followings,‟ and the second was „the use of clientelist politics to bind local 
notables to the party and local voters to the candidates.‟ (Chris Allen: 1995)  So in essence, 
voters were promised by well-known, trusted candidates, collective material benefits such as 
access to basic infrastructure, social amenities, clinics and schools, while these candidates in turn 
were offered personal benefits such as cash, land or credit, by leaders who had access to private 
or public resources. This marked the beginning of clientelist politics in much of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. This resulted because the moment the candidates came to power and were given access to 
the immense resources of the state, their priority was the consolidation of their win. This 
basically involved careful allocation of funds to specific ministries in order to extend their 
support and recruit more charismatic personnel. As such, internal relations within the political 
took on a power reproducing nature, with parties in power increasing their chances of 
maintaining power through the effective support and recruitment of clients. So it came to be that, 
„the legitimacy of African political elites… derive(d) from their ability to nourish the clientele on 
which their power rest(ed)‟ (Chabal, P and Daloz J-P: 1999). 
 
The creation of a clientelist state did not go unopposed, with members of the opposition refusing 
to subjugate to the new state system which inherently excluded them from the political. It is not 
surprising that many who had failed to gain power found the situation in post-colonial Africa to 
be unacceptable, not simply because of the increasing corruption which resulted as government 
exploited resources for patrimonial purposes, but mainly because they found themselves 
excluded from the benefits of state. Consequentially opposition parties moved to avoid 
permanent exclusion from the political by exploiting communal divisions; this however only 
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served to politicize long-standing local, ethnic, or religious divisions. „Party conflicts became 
redrawn and reconstructed as communal conflicts (Chris Allen: 1995);‟ Violence proliferated as 
those in power resorted to oppressive tactics, rigged election, harassment, beatings, bans, and 
imprisonment of the opposition party and its members to keep hold of power. In some cases, the 
opposition‟s response reflected the violence of their rivals, and led to the formation of groups of 
party thugs. As party violence increased, so did corruption for personal enrichment, as ruling 
parties depended less on support and more on force to stay in power (Chris Allen: 1995). The 
African states entered into a period of political decay, characterized by the rapid growth of 
politicized communalism, political conflict and violence, abuse of political and human rights, 
and corruption, which would continue over the next decade and a half. Ghana reflects this theory, 
given its turbulent history from 1960-1981, characterized by violent and non-violent coup d‟états 
ending in a period of military government before the return to democracy. 
 
Why did this neo-patrimonial system persist in African states? The answer can be determined in 
a number of factors. The first is that, it has become the standard view that a position in 
government is the main means of personal enrichment. This is what Chanal and Daloz refer to as 
the public sector being appropriated by the private sector. With the entrance of parties into 
government, it is the general sentiment that it one‟s „time to eat‟ – to reap the benefits of the 
system. Moreover, this is exacerbated by the fact that there exists a „wide acceptance of the 
behavior of civil servants‟ (Chabal, P and Daloz J-P: 1999). The populace has come to accept 
and expect that those in power will abuse that power for their own ends, and have quietly 
recognized state bureaucratic institutions as the empty shell it is. Their lack of motivation to 
address the problem, gives civil servants more space and freedom to continue to abuse their 
powers. And generally, civil servants place the edicts of their political leaders over that of any 
regulation put into place by those same political leaders. After all, it is from these leaders that the 
civil servants will gain their share in the spoils of the state, and as such, to contradict these 
political leaders would be unreasonable. In this way, „the most basic rules of bureaucratic 
accountability are flouted at will‟ (Chabal, P and Daloz J-P: 1999). For these reasons, the 
clientelist state still persists in Africa, and Ghana is no exception in this regard. 
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Now if one understands African politics in clientelist terms, what one inherently accepts is that 
the population is not concerned with the policies of government as first and foremost, they 
expect government to be corrupt and think only of their pockets first and foremost. Secondly, the 
population accepts that the politicians they vote for would be able to redirect some small portion 
of those benefits, in some form, their way if they are a member of the politicians‟ clientele 
(ethnic group/ local community). Given this, party policies and platforms are of no importance to 
the average voter when looking at political parties. Individuals are more concerned with what 
resources could be directly amassed from government, as opposed to the larger picture of social 
institutions providing those resources in an ideal world. Hence individuals are willing to sell 
their vote to the most promising buyer. So rather than simply saying individuals blindly follow 
one party or the other without knowing the party policies, we should recognize that individuals 
follow parties looking only at their backgrounds for affirmation of some future, tangible resource 
gained in exchange for their vote. An unfortunate consequence of this is that the state is rendered 
ineffectual mainly because „it has never been in the interests of the (Ghanaian) elite to work for 
the proper institutionalization of the state apparatus (Chabal, P and Daloz J-P: 1999).‟ 
 
The failure of political science models explicated 
Given this, one can understand how political science as applied to a democratic state can fail to 
explain the 50:50 voting patterns of the Ghanaian population. If we simply consulted the political 
science model to explain the polarization we found in Ghana, we would come to two conclusions 
concurrent with the violent polarized state or indifferent populace theories already iterated 
above; using Hotelling‟s model7, one would find that competition in a two-party system would 
drive each party to move towards its opponent‟s ideology because of each party‟s confidence in 
its extremists (its end of the scale) vote, allowing politicians to reach for the crucial middle-of-
the-road voters by moving closer to the opposition. In this case, political parties become less 
extreme and more moderate in policy, resulting in a growing indifference of the population 
towards their candidates. This phenomenon is what Kirchheimer describes as the arrival of the 
catch-all party. Kirchheimer, 1966, argues that modern parties, in their increasing attempt to 
attract votes from whichever social groups they can, have a highly significant effect on 
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ideological competition.
8
 Mass parties gain reason to shift their organization towards the catch-
all system because it seems the more effective option in securing votes. The party leadership, 
concerned only with their ongoing success, forces the party to broaden its appeal to every 
possible group, and so extends beyond their original and distinctive class support.
9
 Contrary to 
the preceding class-based mass parties, existing electoral-professional parties aim for a wider 
market of voters, and so formulate programs which are not particularly partisan or divisive: a 
program which could be said to serve the interest of all involved. In this way, this catchall 
phenomenon contributes to policy convergence, as the need to maintain a distinctive 
constituency through ideology and policy is undermined, thus encouraging a waning of the 
ideological and/or policy distinctiveness of the parties,
10
 and the indifference of the populace vis-
a-vis the two main political parties. It could be argued that this is the case in Ghana, because, 
though the NDC and NPP in their approach and self-description fall left and right of the center 
on a linear political scale, they each profess the same policy objectives of provisions of basic 
human rights to food and security, as well as individual freedoms, as detailed above.  However, I 
will argue this is not the case.  
 
Using Smithies model, 2008
11
 which introduces elastic demand at each end point on the linear 
political scale, one finds that extremist should choose to abstain from the political process 
altogether, rather than vote (probably from disgust at parties compromising on ideologies). As 
such, the predicted political parties convergence on moderation will not occur if most voters are 
massed bimodally near the extremes; the threat of abstention from extremists force the parties to 
keep away from the center, ensuring that their ideologies remain poles apart (as parties cannot 
afford to lose extremist votes in this instance).  In such a situation, democratic government will 
fail to function properly as any government from either extreme end will fail to please a large 
section of the population, and leave a setting that is good breeding grounds for revolution. So, if 
we think of the Ghanaian situation, where both governments hold different ideological 
standpoints though identical policy objectives, it would seem the extremist have failed to pull the 
parties from convergence on the middle (that is, if we accept the threat of violence upon the 
                                               
8
Edwards, 2008 
9
Kirchheimer, 1966 
10
Katz and Mair, 1997: pp.102-103 
11
See Appendix C 
19 
 
announcement of electoral results in 2008 to mean that voters are massed bimodally near the 
extremes on each end of the political scale, as Downs explained above). What then could explain 
this failure of the electorate to pull the parties from converging on central policies? The same 
premise argued from the beginning: Ghanaians tend to ignore the ideological and policy 
standpoints of the major political parties.  
 
More relevant to note is the existing inconsistency between party ideology and party policies as 
advocated by the major political parties. The NPP, which describes itself as a liberal democratic 
advocate and proclaims „free enterprise,‟ expected to occupy the „right‟ side of the political 
spectrum, is seen promoting left-wing policies such as heavy investment in healthcare and 
education. This is self-contradictory. The NDC, which is a social democratic party, expected to 
occupy the „left‟ side of the political spectrum, is seen backing a right-wing policy such as the 
Divestiture of State Owned Enterprise. Again, this is self-contradictory. Down, as expounded on 
in the second paragraph of this section, told us that for voters to be assured in the strategy of 
using ideology over policy as a determinant of their vote, it must be the case that, in formulating 
policies and platforms, political parties keep to this expectation (matching ideology and policy) 
or stand the risk of losing credibility. And as such, the competitive struggle for office would 
compel parties to be both honest and consistent in creating platforms and ideologies and 
developing them over time. (Downs, A. (1957)) This we find is not the case in Ghana, were the 
two parties contradict themselves with no apparent retribution from the Ghanaian populace in 
terms of reduced support.  
 
Furthermore, under more normal circumstances, Down tells us that two opposite social classes 
with no sizeable middle class will more likely be skewed to the left (lower class), with a small 
mode at the right (upper class), leading to installation of a leftish government (granted equal 
individual voting weight) given the majority of the lower class. In this way, the numerical 
distribution of voters along the political scale determines what kind of democracy would 
develop. (Downs, A. (1957))  In this respect again, Ghana fails to meet this expectation. With a 
middle class estimated at only 0.0128% in 2000
12
, its large lower class and tiny upper class 
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political distribution, one would expect the installation of a leftist government at every election 
by a wide margin. However, the victory for the NDC party was .23% of the population. Again, 
this can be explained if one accepts the average Ghanaian ignores the ideological basis and class-
based policy initiatives of the major parties and focuses on something else.   
 
The Support for the Hypothesis 
So if the average Ghanaian pays no heed to ideological and policy initiatives of parties as argued 
above, what caused the strong division shown in electoral results? The hypothesis which the 
research sought to support was that individual Ghanaians, using historical events or ethnicity as a 
basis, had developed strong biased preferences for one party over the other, which had no basis 
in policy or ideology. In this way, the Ghanaian population naturally became split bimodally 
along the political spectrum due to historical and ethnic factors that influence their choices in the 
clientelist state that Ghana is.  And with performance and ideology not determining one‟s vote, 
we can understand how those falling into the lower-class of society do not feel compelled to 
move toward a party skewed left, if their historical or ethic preference and bias veers right. This 
then provides reason for why we saw only a .23% left win in a country with a majority lower-
class population. Given this, the research sought to show that these biases existed within the 
Ghanaian populace and explain the 2008 election results.    
 
The Historical Ethnic Explanation 
In terms of Ethnicity, one needs only to understand the historical relations between the major 
ethnic groups and how that translates to party relations, to comprehend how individuals vote in 
favor of one party with this bias. In a country with over 35 languages spoken, split along many 
ethnic lines, there is a wealth of historical interaction which has gone unaccounted for. However, 
what any Ghanaian could tell you is the basic course of history, taught in schools and evidenced 
in social settings, that has led to the popularly cited ethnic biases/stereotypes within the country. 
The notable accepted biases are as such; The Ashanti‟s suffer from a superiority complex, 
enhanced by their proud history and the wealth (Gold, cocoa, timber, among many other natural 
resources) found in the Ashanti region and managed by the Ashantehene (chief). This 
expectation stems from the past strength and size of the Ashanti Kingdom (17
th
-19
th
 century)
13
, 
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which allowed the Ashanti‟s to aggressively pursue their expansion in the general area now 
known as Ghana. Located center-south of modern Ghana, locked between the Northern states 
and the southern coastal states, any expansion encroached on others territories. So, naturally, the 
desire for expansion by the Ashanti kingdom put the southern ethnic groupings on guard against 
a possible invasion. This fear led a large population in the south to create the Fanti confederacy, 
which compounded (after growing tensions), in the Ashanti-Fanti war of 1806. Moreover, this 
fear was realized in the quick, strategic alliance of the southern states with British colonial 
powers to head off possible future Ashanti domination. With this history, one can come to 
understand the root of the general ambivalence of the southern Ghanaian population towards the 
Ashanti peoples. More interestingly, the mighty Ashanti kingdom demanded slaves for the new 
market created by Europeans, and most of these slaves came from the territories it conquered in 
now Northern Ghana, Burkina Faso and Mali. Here lies the expressed hatred towards the 
Ashanti‟s by the Northerners (a reference to the people in the large area comprising northern 
Ghana; though these people include many different ethnic groups and languages, they are 
generalized under this title), who continue to view the Ashantis as arrogant bullies.
14
 From this, 
one would understand why it‟s the general belief, and evidenced in elections, that an Ashanti 
man would never win the Northerners vote.  
On a different note, the Ewe‟s of the Volta region in eastern Ghana formally joined the country 
when British Togoland and the Gold Coast (former Ghana) were officially merged in December 
1956. The Ewe‟s could as such be thought of us a relatively new group to join the ethnic circle in 
the area that encompasses modern Ghana. Like a new kid at school, the Ewes kept to themselves 
and have not changed since, if one takes word at face value. The Ewe‟s have been stereotyped as 
strongly family-oriented: though loyal to a fault to those they see as kin, it is widely 
acknowledged that outsiders are treated, and remain, as such. From this characterization, one 
should expect, as evidenced by elections, that a Ewe man running for office is assured the Ewe 
vote.  
These generally acknowledged divisions and stereotypes have proven useful tools in creating 
political division within the country, as one may posit that, it is the politicians that create 
ethnicity and not ethnicity which feeds into politics (as expounded on by Chris Allen above). To 
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be unambiguous, the National Patriotic Party (NPP), despite claiming otherwise, is widely 
acknowledged as an Ashanti party, having been formed by Ashantis and maintained by an 
Ashanti leadership. As such, it is a party to be met with the general ambivalence of the southern 
population, as well as the strong disassociation of the northern population, and finds its love and 
welcome in the Ashanti region and among many of its cousins, the Akans. This is a pattern easily 
seen in voting results over the years. The NDC on the other hand was formed by an Ewe, and as 
such, is the object of the familial loyalty of the Ewes, and can be said to secure the Northern vote 
by default (the only other feasible option to the NPP). This again is a pattern easily seen in 
voting results over the years. We may look to results in the 2008 runoff to support these 
statements: 
In the Ashanti region the NPP won 92.3% of the constituency vote, and in the Eastern region 
(home to many Akans - the Ashanti‟s cousins) the NPP won 75% of the constituency vote. In the 
Volta region, the NDC won 100% of the constituency vote, and in the Northern region the NDC 
won 80% of the constituency vote.
15
 In the remaining four regions, factors other than ethnicity 
may have come into play. In one instance we find an inherent contradiction; the Brongs of the 
Brong Ahafo region have strong yet bitter ties to the Ashantis, being their relatives, yet having 
been oppressed by the Ashantis in the past. The region voted 63% in favor of the NPP. In another 
instance we have swing states, states with no explicit party loyalties; both the Central region and 
the Greater Accra Region are known to be swing states, given that the Fanti‟s of the central 
region are generally ambivalent towards the major parties, and the large mix of ethnic 
populations inhabiting Accra prevents ethnic-voting analysis by region results. Nonetheless, the 
NDC won 68% of the constituency vote in the Central region and 63% of it in the Greater Accra 
region (Ephson tells us due to a desire for change from 8 years of NPP rule).  The western 
region, which is known for its independent stand, not shockingly, produced a perfect split of 50-
50 in its constituency votes for the parties
16
. In this way, we can see how ethnic preference can 
manifest in election results.   
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The Historical Political Explanation 
Even if we may understand the existence of an ethnic bias, we may compound the issue with the 
historical bias associated with the two major political parties. To explain this, one must draw 
from the recent political history of Ghana and the roots of the two parties which are the basis for 
the anticipated biases. Professor Adu Boahen, in his book The Ghanaian Sphinx tells us that 
“there are only two real political groups or parties or…political cultures, in this country (Ghana) 
– the CPP/PNP culture and the PP/PFP/UNC culture (Boahen (2009)).” Though the country has 
seen its share of military government, authoritarian rule is not a culture that the people embrace, 
and has been successively followed by return to civilian rule. This has taken the form of peaceful 
transitions, as well as coup d‟état‟s, violent and non-violent, instigated by members of the 
military itself and the police on behalf of the people. The CPP culture, also known as 
Nkrumaism, is one that is based on the ideas of Scientific Socialism, while that of the PP is one 
formulated by J.B Danquah, with the ideology of Ghanaism in mind; it promotes the 
establishment of a right-wing capitalist state. But as has already been said, Ghanaians ignore 
political ideologies, so this differential is not what stands out but rather the people who founded 
these ideologies and the parties that have descended with the attached (slightly modified) 
doctrines and the same supporters.  
 
At Ghana‟s independence, the two main parties that stood out were the United Gold Coast 
Convention (UGCC) led by J.B. Danquah and the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) led by 
Kwame Nkrumah. Initially, Nkrumah had worked under the UGCC, but broke away from the 
party after he came into conflict with party leaders such as Danquah, and formed the CPP. Then, 
the National Liberation Movement (NLM) was formed, and posed a challenge to the CPP. 
Founded in Kumasi, the NLM relied upon history to fan Asante‟s ethnic sentiments.  The NLM‟s 
core of old guard-traditional chiefs and intelligentsia made its base widely parochial and not truly 
national. In the end it was the CPP that led Ghana to its independence, having a truly national 
base. However, it wasn‟t long before the party morals degenerated and reduced Ghana to a 
corrupt, restrictive, one-party state. It was at this point, in face of great social adversity and 
quickly decreasing support for Nkrumah, that the CPP was overthrown by the National 
Liberation Council (NLC), composed of senior police and military officers. These new leaders 
were aided behind the scenes by the political advisory council, composed of former politicians 
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such as K.A. Busia and Akuffo Addo, who had provided the strongest opposition to Nkrumah 
during the UGCC and NLM days. However this new government failed to make strides in the 
economic field and living conditions continued to decrease, leading to intense criticism; the NLC 
witnessed over 100 strikes in its 3 year reign, and transferred power to the politicians who had 
been patiently biding their time. Ghana returned to civilian rule after Busia Progress Party (PP) 
won the 1969 election; now Nkrumah‟s opposition from 1948 had come into government.  
 
The PP relied heavily on external advisors, such as the Harvard Development Advisory Group, 
the IMF, World Band and nations that Ghana had borrowed from, and this lack of internal 
consultation was the undoing of Busia‟s regime. As with Nkrumah‟s corrupt one-party state, 
under the PP regime, economic hardships, political intolerance and a sense of helplessness 
pervaded the nation. The National Redemption Council (NRC)‟s coup brought down the PP 
regime. Despite its claims of diverse ideologies from that of the PP, the NRC ended up 
implementing similar policies, which led to the exact same ending for this military government 
(at least in name). The regime re-organized itself into the Supreme Military Council (SMC), 
which through corrupt self-enrichment and clientelist favoritism managed to alienate a large 
section of the population and disregarded the interests of workers. On June 4
th
 1979, the SMC 
was overthrown by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), in a bloody clash between 
rank and file of the army and their senior officers. The AFRC was bent on carrying out a “house-
cleaning” exercise to combat corruption, and this led to the execution of two successive heads of 
state (NRC and SMC leaders) as well as many other senior officers. The AFRC then allowed the 
schedule of return to civilian rule to continue, handing power over to the People‟s National Party 
(PNP), led by Hillal Limann. Though Civilian rule once more was expected to correct matters, 
the composition of those seeking political power was the same coalition of forces which had 
been the beneficiaries of state largesse even as the economy declined. It was the same class of 
professionals, intelligentsia and veteran politicians who had always aspired for state power. With 
their past performance as an indicator, it was not long before the AFRC ousted the new 
government out of power on charges of corruption and negligence once more. It was at this point 
that the AFRC reformed itself as the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). The PNDC 
resurrected the memory of Kwame Nkrumah by giving support to the view that that foreign 
interests and historical colonial rule was the major reason for Ghana‟s condition. The PNDC‟s 
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plan favored a mass-based, anti-establishment movement which would seek popular 
participation, ensure justice and fairness to all (Osei, (1999)).
17
  
 
One need only establish the roots of both the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) to understand that the ensuing rivalry between the two parties runs 
deep and began prior to the decolonization of Ghana. The NPP was born out of the Danquah-
Busia Memorial Club. The club was founded in Kumasi in the late 80‟s by the veteran nationalist 
and freedom-fighter, Yaw Attakora Gyimah and its main purpose was to keep alive the liberal 
democratic ideas and traditions of J.B. Danquah and K.A. Busia. That is to say, the NPP is an 
ideological descendant of the UGCC, the NLM, the NLC, the PP, and the PNP. The NDC on the 
other hand was birthed from the PNDC under the leadership of Jerry John Rawlings.  It adopted 
the ideologies of Nkrumah, and as such adopted the historical standpoints of the CPP, and its 
immediate predecessors, the AFRC and the PNDC. The NDC aimed to ensure that Ghanaians 
continue to build on the foundations which had been laid together in the last ten years of 
Rawlings led PNDC military rule (1981-1991), and that Ghana should not go back to the failures 
of the past that created conditions for interruptions and even reversals of Ghana‟s development 
process. In this way, we see that ideologically and historically, the CPP(NDC) vied and won 
against the NLM (NPP)  and the UGCC (NPP), but was then ousted out of power by the NLC 
(NPP) which handed over power in elections to PP (NPP), who was then ousted out of power by 
the NRC/SMC (Independent). The AFRC (NDC) then kicked the SMC (Independent) out of 
power and handed over power through elections to the PNP (NPP). Shortly afterwards, the PNP 
(NPP) was kicked out of power once more and was replaced by the PNDC (NDC), who then lead 
Ghana to the 1992 elections, were the current NDC and NPP parties had been formed. In the end, 
though party names had changed more than eight times, the same individuals filtered through the 
system in different guises, advancing the same ideologies, appealing to the same crowds, in the 
case of the NPP. While with the NDC, they adopted the legacy of Kwame Nkrumah, building a 
populist movement on socialist lines and recalling a past desire for freedom and justice; in this 
way, they became an embodiment of the CPP (though the CPP as a party does exist with a 
different stance than before currently). As such, each party can be thought to have inherited a 
support-base from its predecessors. 
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Nevertheless, rather than thinking of the NDC in Nkrumah-like terms, some would call it the 
third wave in Ghanaian politics. Here, what is important to note is the popularity and grievances 
caused in the arrival of this third wave. The coup d‟état led by the PNDC came us a populist 
movement, riding high on the popularity of Jerry John Rawlings, to oust a deemed corrupt 
government from office. However, the executions that took place during the AFRC‟s “house-
cleaning” and later the murder of the judges (three high court judges and the personnel 
department manager of the State Industrial Corporation were kidnapped and killed on 5
th
 July, 
1982: an act said to be commanded by Rawlings in personal revenge for the acts of judiciary 
bodies revising AFRC‟s activities in 1979 (Petchenkine (1992))), managed to alienate a large 
section of the population that held and holds that, this action was far too extreme and 
unnecessary even in the midst of the revolutionary atmosphere the country was filled with. 
Moreover, this socialist wave resulted in many major business leaders being imprisoned, while 
many were forced to flee and abandon their property, which was seized by the government 
regardless. Furthermore, the re-distribution tactics employed by the AFRC, which confiscated 
goods from local traders thought to be hoarding food and charging high prices in the droughts of 
the 1980‟s, left scars on those who fell victim to their socialist campaign. Those scars remain 
today, and such individuals are drawn towards the NPP naturally, believing the NDC to be 
brutish. In the same way, the workers who benefited from these re-distributions witnessed the 
detention of managers who had profited while they labored, and those who believed the 
executions necessary, align themselves with the NDC who they believe have it right. Of course, 
this is all tampered by the fact that ethnicity plays a role in the decision as to who to vote for 
(That is to say, the NPP, UGCC, the NLM, the NLC, the PP, have always maintained Ashanti 
and Akan leadership, while the NDC, like the CPP, purports to be „national‟ because it knows no 
regional, ethnic or religious boundaries but encompasses all Ghanaians; its leadership has been 
composed of diverse groupings, Nzemas, Ewes, Northerners, Gas and more), but these historical 
ties should not be taken for granted either.  
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Psychology Literature Review 
 
This research searches for My-side bias and Irrational belief persistence in identifying the 
existence of strong beliefs (biased perceptions) within the Ghanaian populace. The research 
sought to expose a disposition in the Ghanaian populace to maintain their set preferences for 
political parties, due to their convictions that one party is better than the other. Such convictions 
were to be found in the manner by which search, especially search for evidence, and the making 
of inferences given the evidence at hand was conducted by individuals. The expectation was that 
individuals would, in the search for evidence concerning their party, look only for evidence that 
favored their political party and withhold from searching for evidence that contradicted or 
slighted their party. If they were to find evidence that did contradict their beliefs about their 
party, they were expected to ignore and discredit it. These two characteristics sought are what 
Perkins, Perkins, Bushey, and Faraday refer to as “myside bais”(Perkins et al., 1986)18. Here, the 
Ghanaian populace was expected to display reasoning that demonstrated that they looked only to 
„their side‟ of the argument, specifically their political party‟s good points, and neglected 
viewpoints to the contrary. 
 
In this way, the research seeks to expose Irrational belief persistence; that is not to say that there 
is not a rational basis on which the Ghanaian populace determines its party affiliation, but that in 
the maintenance of its party loyalties, the process of search for evidence and inference from 
evidence is biased so as to reinforce pre-existing beliefs about the party. This manner of thinking 
is irrational in so far as it allows for incorrect beliefs to persist, and moreover, strengthens such 
belief when they ought to become weaker with growing evidence. Specifically, one would 
expect, given this bias, that the Ghanaian populace would grow stronger in its commitment to 
one party, as opposed to losing faith in it, even when the performance by the party and its 
members are deplorable. The persistence of such faith is as such, irrational. (Baron, 2008)
19
 
 
Irrational belief persistence, as many have noted, is one of the major sources of human folly 
(Bacon 1620/1960; Janis and Mann, 1977; Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983; Nisbett and Ross, 
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1980)
20. The tendency to hold onto one‟s belief without sufficient regard to the evidence 
available is a deviation from our concepts of human reason and allows one to be critical of the 
judgments rational individuals make. Irrational belief persistence results from „my-side‟ bias; 
specifically, we identify it in the over-weighing of evidence consistent with one‟s favored belief, 
the under-weighing of evidence to the contrary, and the failure of one to search impartially for 
evidence. For the Ghanaian population, we thought to find Irrational belief persistence in the 
advocated support of, or opposition to, parties despite factual evidence to the contrary, and the 
choice of political media that individuals engaged in streamlining their political consciousness. 
(Baron, 2008) 
 
Moreover, one of the guiding principles underlying the research conducted and the biases sought 
was the neutral-evidence principle. The neutral-evidence principle is the theory that “neutral 
evidence should not strengthen belief.”21 Neutral evidence within this research was specifically 
taken to mean „weak evidence;‟ that is to say, evidence that was gathered from uncredible 
sources (a fact highlighted to subjects) and exaggerated beyond truth, and mixed evidence that 
lent no particular support or opposition to either of the political parties concerned. In this way, 
the evidence was neutral because it was grounded in no truth and hence should have been 
disregarded entirely with regards to belief, or was equally consistent with a belief and its 
converse, providing equal evidence both for and against the various parties, and hence should 
have nullified any possible effect of the evidence on belief. The research, in identifying a bias 
within the population, sought the violation of the Neutral-evidence principle among Ghanaians; 
that is to say, the research expected that individuals would respond positively to the „weak‟ 
evidence that supported their beliefs, regardless of the fact that it was baseless and equally 
contradicted their own beliefs. As such, similar to experiments conducted by Lord, Ross, and 
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Lepper (1979)
22
, the hypothesis behind the experiment was that exposure to baseless and mixed 
data would result in the strengthening of subjects polarized political beliefs, rather than leaving 
no effect, as one would expect from an impartial consideration of inconclusive data.  
 
Lord, Ross, and Lepper looked specifically at the bias they titled „biased assimilation.‟ Here, the 
authors sought to explore the consequences of introducing objective data to opposing factions, in 
social decision making.  Specifically, they used mixed or inconclusive evidence that defined 
complex social issues in examining the social response to the data provided. Logically, one 
would expect that this sort of evidence would lead to a moderation in ones viewpoint using 
mixed data, or at least be ignored by members of opposing factions, however Lord, Ross and 
Leper expected to find  that belief polarization would increase, as opposed to decrease or remain 
unchanged, when this data was presented. The assumption on which the “polarization 
hypothesis‟ was based was that data relevant to a belief was not processed in an impartial 
manner, but rather, “the judgements about the validity, reliability, relevance, and sometimes even 
the meaning of proffered evidence are biased by the apparent consistency of that evidence with 
the perceiver's theories and expectations.”23 In this way, Individuals were expected to assimilate 
in a biased manner neutral evidence that supported their views as further evidence in support of 
their view, while dismissing the contradictions that lay in such mixed evidence. In this way, the 
same neutral piece of data could lend support to each side of an opposing faction, bolstering their 
beliefs in opposition of the other. So though neither set of data provided conclusive evidence, the 
reports resulted in subjects becoming polarized in their beliefs; that is to say, they became 
stronger in their initial belief on both ends of the opposing spectrum. This result runs contrary to 
logic and has the effect of perpetuating incorrect beliefs as subjects, in the inferential process, 
readily used evidence processed in a biased manner as a result of the initial belief to „justify‟ the 
original belief. (Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979))   
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The research sought to mimic the findings of the Lord, Ross, and Lepper experiment with biases 
in favor of a political party as the basis, with objective and weak evidence expected to be 
assimilated into, and polarize, these pre-existing beliefs. Nonetheless, the biased response against 
counter-evidence needs to be extreme to reflect polarization. Normatively, we expect the strength 
of evidence presented on both ends of the belief spectrum to force convergence to the middle of 
the range, unless individuals already maintain more evidence for the side the favor; in this case, 
evidence to the contrary of one‟s belief only adds relative strength to the opposing end. As such, 
one more clearly views polarization in situations were individuals given nothing but negative 
evidence, strengthen their initial belief despite having no positive support for it. Here, the bias 
against counter-evidence is extreme in the sense that negative evidence somehow results in a 
strengthening of one‟s positive belief; here, one can assume the evidence is ignored, criticized or 
degraded in such way that it ends up reinforcing the very thing it sought to refute. For example, 
in the research conducted, in questioning if the National Patriotic Party cheated in the 2008 
presidential elections as noted by objective observers, subjects who favored the party or strongly 
believed this statement to be false, responded either by ignoring the evidence altogether and 
declaring it was not true, or criticized the evidence in positing that if the party did cheat, then is 
should have won the election, but by the fact that it failed to win the election, we can conclude 
that it did not cheat.  In this way, objective evidence could lead individuals to express highly 
polarized viewpoints. (Lord, Ross, Lepper (1979), Baron (2008)) 
 
Other essential mechanisms of underlying irrational belief persistence that this research sought to 
utilize in identifying biases were Selective exposure and Belief Overkill. “Selective exposure is 
the tendency to search selectively for evidence that will support current beliefs.”24 In order to 
preserve existing beliefs, Individuals consciously choose to expose themselves to information 
they know will most likely support their convictions.  In this way, supporters of the National 
Democratic Party were predicted to listen to  “Radio Gold,” a radio station strongly influenced in 
favor of the NDC party,  and read publications such as the “Heritage” and “Inquirer” that favored 
the political party. In this way, individuals strengthened their beliefs by listening to only their 
side of the argument. In this way, individuals easily fall prey to assuming that there are no good 
arguments on the opponents end and wholeheartedly assume that their manner of thinking is 
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right. This selective narrowing of one‟s viewpoint helps maintain irrational belief persistence in 
that individuals never have a chance to challenge their own views, and as such, modify them 
with growing contradictory evidence. Individuals manipulate their own beliefs in only listen to 
their side of the argument, limiting opportunities to incite change, and as such, beliefs are slow to 
change. “This kind of manipulation is particularly easy, because people tend to change their 
beliefs in response to one-sided evidence even when they know it is one Sided. They under-
compensate for their knowledge that there is another side.”25  
 
Another method by which individuals manipulate evidence to suit their own beliefs is in the 
avoidance of the rational, qualitative method of balancing evidence. When presented with good 
evidence on two sides of an issue, the individual downplays evidence contrary to his viewpoint 
in assuming that all the good evidence is only on one side: his side. “Belief overkill is the 
tendency to deny conflicting arguments, even if they do not need to be denied.”26 Here, 
individuals take the objective or factual truth of a matter and condemn it as false, despite the fact 
that it can exist consistently with their own beliefs. In illustration, the research asked subjects if 
they believed the NDC and the NPP respectively, as stated in their manifesto, had the well-being 
of the Ghanaian people at the center of their ideology; many were quick to deny this fact for one 
of the parties, while believing it to be true of the other, as though it was not possible for both 
parties to be simultaneously concerned with the well-being of the populace. One could read this 
result as a reflection of the fact that subjects felt it necessary to deny that a party they opposed 
could do something good, or even propose to be concerned with doing good (Jervis, (1976))
27
. 
However, rationally, we know this is not the case; one can objectively admit that each party 
claims to concern itself with the good, and still maintain that one party is better than the other at 
this, by virtue of say the outcomes of each regime. In this way, one objectively considers the 
evidence, and yet maintains one‟s belief. Nonetheless, subjects fail to do this, and rather, 
discredit objective evidence and act as though it is only possible for one party to maintain 
humanist concerns; here they display a case of belief overkill. They strengthen their own belief 
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by convincing themselves that the argument on the other-side is false, allowing them to disregard 
it completely and persist in their irrational belief. (Baron, (2008)) 
 
So in these different ways, people show biases that strengthen and perpetuate their already 
existing beliefs. The research conducted reflected this in that some individuals revealed that it 
was the case that they strengthened their own beliefs by regarding the arguments and evidence 
brought forth by their opponents as weak, as well as by listening only to their own side. Many 
studies have found this sort of bias toward information can strengthen desired beliefs. (Frey, 
1986)
28
 The research looked to identify these biases as a basis on which we could establish 
individual support for political parties and determine the relative strengths of such beliefs, and 
existing polarization denoted by such belief, as a quantitative measure based on the biases 
subjects expressed. 
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Methodology 
 
My research was conducted in Accra, Ghana, starting in late December 2010 and ending in early 
January 2011. The research project was designed to identify the biases of Selective Exposure, 
Belief Overkill, Biased Assimilation/Polarization, and beliefs about the Ghanaian political 
mindset, within the general Ghanaian adult population. Each participant gave consent in the form 
of a signature on a consent form. The research was conducted by way of a questionnaire, 
constructed with the intention of drawing out biases, in the form of an oral interview. The choice 
of an oral interview was made in order to avoid a situation in which the illiterate, 45.5%29 of the 
population, were unable to partake in the interview. Interviews were conducted on a one-on-one 
basis, two-on-one basis, or a three-to-one basis as determined by the circumstances. This is to 
say, it depended on the amount of people who wanted to be interviewed and were waiting to be 
interviewed.
30
 Interviews were recorded and scored for biases in line with the pre-anticipated 
responses that stemmed from the natures of the questions themselves (see Appendix A detailed 
questionnaire). That is to say, a question like which newspaper do you enjoy reading, yielding a 
response of „the Heritage,‟ a paper inclined in favor of the NDC will automatically score for 
Selective Exposure an NDC pro-bias for that question. In total, 110 interviews were conducted, 
with each one taking an average of 30 minutes.  The combined results based off the individual 
scores were then analyzed using the R programming language, to determine if there was 
polarization in the Ghanaian populace. 
 
In conducting the experiment, subjects were first made aware of the nature of the experiment and 
its boundaries to ensure that they felt comfortable discussing political issues with us, and were 
not inclined to lie. Subjects were told that the study included no experimental procedures and 
involved minimal risk and discomfort. Moreover, the questions asked involved no personal 
information other than what participants might expect to provide in an opinion poll, and all 
responses were to be treated as confidential. In this way, subjects were aware that in no case will 
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responses from any participant be identified. Furthermore, it was stressed that participation in 
this study was voluntary; refusal to participate involved no penalty or loss of benefits to which 
participants were otherwise entitled and participants may have discontinued participation at any 
time without penalty. In the case that participants sought extra information on the subject, or 
wanted to lodge a complaint, they were provided the contact information for the principal 
investigator, advisor, and the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board to do so. It 
was reassuring for some to see a foreign institution as a part of the process, reinforcing my 
guarantee that the data was to leave the country. The consent form, which contained these 
details, was to ensure participants of the ethical considerations and legitimacy of the experiment 
being conducted, and moreover, guarantee the well being of participants during and after the 
process.   
 
A questionnaire was used as the primary means of obtaining the necessary information for my 
research. The justification of this method is, for one to see a manifestation of the biases sought, 
one would need individuals to express a bias some form. In order to get individuals to express 
their biases, one need persuade individuals to discuss their opinions on government in many 
wide-ranging contexts, and over different time periods, to properly establish a strong pattern of 
favoritism or detestation. As such, questions were designed to this specification, ranging over 
many different events, time-periods and actions, which would lead individuals to provide a 
general overview of their beliefs about a party. Both factual and exaggerated information were 
used in the questions, to allow for biases of belief overkill and biased assimilation/polarization to 
be identified (see paragraphs below). This method was deemed best, as the only other option 
would be to examine election results by area. However, election results cannot properly capture 
the reality of favor or abhorrence that one party has or suffers, given the compilation of many 
different factors that may influence one‟s vote. Hence, a questionnaire appeared to be the most 
justifiable means of detecting preferences within the populace. 
 
Problems anticipated with this method of research were first and foremost a lack of trust and 
consequently false responses from the population questioned. Though Ghana is 19 years out of 
military rule, and many of the respondents questioned were but children during this time period, 
there was hesitancy about responding to questions that touched on the political sphere. 
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Individuals were very wary about identifying with one party or another. They were often 
suspicious of the research, questioning if it was a project of the government, probably to identify 
individuals who proved to be supporters of their opponents. Thankfully, this was not a deep-
rooted fear, as many individuals were quickly convinced with a few words of reassurance, the 
names on the consent form (that is to say, the listing of the University of Pennsylvania), as well 
as the possibility of using initials as opposed to their full names in agreeing to participate. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of distorted answers initially cannot be properly assessed (I say 
beginning because all lost themselves in their opinions quite quickly).  This fear can further be 
assumed in the results for party identification, given that 54.5% of the subjects chose „no party‟ 
though a majority showed strong political preferences. 
 
The questionnaire was composed specifically with the purpose of identifying the three biases of 
Selective Exposure, Belief Overkill, and Biased Assimilation, as well as to expose corresponding 
beliefs about the Ghanaian political mindset: 
 
Section A, tested for Selective Exposure. This was done by listing politically-oriented media, as 
well as neutral media, and leaving open the option of other types of media, to determine if an 
individual preferred a form of political geared media, or neutral media. The three main forms of 
media, political or otherwise, that pervade the Ghanaian society are Radio, Newspapers, and 
Television. As such, the questionnaire asked for an individual‟s preference of station, newspaper, 
and television channel, to determine if there existed a situation where individuals strongly 
preferred one politically associated form of media to another. This would display a case of 
selective exposure. An illustration of the questions posed is:  
 “What radio stations do you prefer to listen to, Joy FM, Radio Gold, Peace FM, Choice FM, or 
Other?”.  
 
A selection of Joy FM would be neutral as the radio station is not known to perpetuate politically 
oriented material, while Radio Gold would be thought to be NDC skewed and Peace FM to be 
NPP skewed. In this way, a selective bias is exposed depending on what political media the 
participant listens to. Three questions were posed. 
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The second section, Section B, tested for Belief Overkill. This was done by presenting factual 
information or information obtained by credible organizations, and asking for beliefs about the 
verity of this information. A biased individual was expected to deny this objective truth and 
show stubborn preference for their initial belief and in this way, display Belief Overkill. Two 
measures of Belief Overkill were obtained: a strict measure which did not account for 
embellishment and a lenient measure which did account for embellishment of the objective truth 
(subjective, hence the distinction). Embellishment was noted in a case, given factual information 
such as “In An agenda for positive change, the NPP promised to the people of Ghana "a change that 
will be reflected in a lowering of the intolerably high cost of living and a reduction in the 
depressingly high rate of unemployment, a change that will bring jobs and a living wage for the 
majority of our people …" and asked “Do you believe that the NPP had this goal for Ghana?” 
Individuals embellish the truth in stressing the point that the NPP seeks what is best for the nation 
as promised, with added examples to truly convince one. This would have been scored as a pro-NPP 
bias because, if one felt it was the unambiguous truth, there would be no need to reinforce the 
prompt passionately, and that they passionately do so unnecessarily reflects a strong preference for 
the NPP party.  An example of a strict Belief Overkill question with the prompt given is: 
“The Ghana Legal Literacy and Resource Foundation, an independent non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) which observed the 2000 general elections… commended the electoral 
process and described it as "largely free and fair." 
7. Do you agree or disagree that the electoral process was “largely free and fair?” 
● Do you agree or disagree that the NDC played fair? 
● Do you agree or disagree that the NPP played fair? 
Given that the information presented is from an objective source/observer, the answers should all 
agree to an objective truth. Nonetheless, all do not agree. Those who disagree either display 
disillusionment with the political process by denouncing all politics as corrupt, or display a 
Belief Overkill bias by naming one party as corrupt while the other is relieved from any possible 
guilt, when the truth mentions no guilt to begin with. The disillusioned response is marked as 
such, neutral/disillusioned, while those who show a bias are scored as either NDC con-bias or 
NPP con-bias with regards to which party they slandered. Six prompts (each marked as a 
separate question) were given, with an average of three subset questions per one prompt; a total 
of eighteen subset question were posed.   
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Section C tested for Biased Assimilation/Polarization, presenting prompt questions that would 
prove to be weak or neutral evidence in favor or disfavor of one political organization. A bias 
would be observed if the individual were to use the presented information in a manner that would 
support his or her own belief, despite the lack of credibility. An illustration of a Baised 
Assimilation question with the prompt given is: 
“What the NPP must come to terms with is the fact that the good people of Ghana gave them an 
eight-year mandate to address the socio-economic challenges confronting them which they failed 
miserably necessitating the NPP being booted out of government” (The Lens) 
1. Do you think this commentator is right? Did the NPP fail Ghanaians in their 8 years of 
power? 
The prompt arose from a politically-oriented newspaper which generally skews perception of the 
opposition in a negative light. Moreover, the statement itself is objectively exaggerated and as 
such was counted as weak evidence. A response agreeing or disagreeing (depending on reason 
given) would demonstrate a bias.  Four sections were involved (each marked as a question): 
performance, events, drugs, and opinions. A total of fourteen prompts were provided, with 
eighteen subset questions posed.    
 
Section D tested for beliefs about the Ghanaian political mindset. This was done by posing 
questions about the most popular political characterizations, politically biased, lacking 
objectivity, and ethnic-minded.  In these ways, questions were designed to expose biases and 
beliefs about the Ghanaian political mindset. An example of a Mindset question with the prompt 
given is: 
“When it comes to choosing a president, Ghanaians seem to be putting more emphasis on ideas 
and values than in the past. Today, more and more voters look beyond tribe and qualifications in 
examining candidates‟ personal and professional qualities and values.” 
1.  Do “more and more voters look beyond tribe” in choosing a president? Yes or no? 
These results then could be actually weighed against the biases, or lack of biases, found in the 
first three sections as aligned with subjects‟ ethnicities. Five prompts were given with a total of 
seven subset question posed.   
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If a bias was found in Section A to C, a value of „1‟ was entered into a score sheet under the 
corresponding bias detected (pro ndc/npp or con ndc/npp); if the answer was objective, unbiased, 
hence neutral, a value of „1‟ was entered under neutral. The values for each question (a 
tabulation of the „1‟s‟ given for each possible presence of a bias or none in the subset questions) 
were then used to analyze the biases within the population. An example of a compressed score 
sheet for a subject is presented below: 
 
File BL recording 3b 
Selective Exposure Pro 
NDC 
Con 
NDC 
Pro NPP Con 
NPP 
Pro 
Other 
Con 
Other 
Neutral Disillusioned 
Question 1        1  
Question 2   1      
Question 3       1  
Belief Overkill Pro 
NDC 
Con 
NDC 
Pro NPP Con 
NPP 
Pro 
Other 
Con 
Other 
Neutral Disillusioned 
Question 2   2     1  
Question 3   2       1   
Question 4          3   
Question 5   1 1     1   
Question 6 1     1 1  1   
Question 7    2       
Biased Assimilation/Polarization Pro 
NDC 
Con 
NDC 
Pro NPP Con 
NPP 
Pro 
Other 
Con 
Other 
Neutral Disillusioned 
Question 1 1 3 6      1   
Question 2           2   
Question 3           2   
Question 4     2      1   
Total 2 6 18 1 1  15  
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Given the above score sheet, we see a large presence con-ndc/pro-npp bias, a near non-existing 
bias for other political parties, and a significant number of neutral response for the participant. 
As such, though we identify a polarized bias within this individual participant, he or she does 
maintain an objective perspective on some questions. These figures were then analyzed, as 
explained in the „Results‟ section following, using statistical methods (R programming 
language).  
    
(See Appendix A for Detailed Analysis of Questionnaire) 
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Results 
 
From the methodology, it was explained that numerical values of „1‟ were entered into the score 
sheet to signify the presence or absence of a particular bias was expressed by a subject. This was 
then summed in accordance with the Section (see methodology) and question (see appendix A) 
and the subset that a question fell under, to give a total score for a participant in each category. 
The possible biases expressed for any questions were Pro-NDC/NPP/Other and the converse, 
con-NDC/NPP/Other. If no bias was noted, the question was marked neutral (see appendix A). 
Participants were given twenty prompts, and asked thirty-nine related questions that searched for 
a bias. Answers from these questions could then be used quantitatively to identify the political 
preferences of the subjects questioned. In order to analyze the research results, two conditions 
were specified given the results obtained:    
 
The first condition was that questions were eliminated from consideration if they obtained a 
response less than two or greater than 108, out of the total possible 110 responses given. This is 
because questions are not very informative when almost all subjects give the same answer. 
Given this condition, we eliminated the “Pro/con other party bias” from consideration and 
focused mainly on the NDC and the NPP biases. 
  
The second condition was given in the elimination of Neutral and Disillusioned responses from 
consideration, in order to analyze only the biases that individuals expressed. The main focus of 
analysis hence was the Pro/Con NDC biases and the Pro/Con NPP biases found in subjects. 
 
The summary of results below show the Mean, Median and Standard Deviation bias scores that 
the population reflected given these conditions. That is to say, the data below reflects the 
revealed bias for a specific party, in its aggregation across the subject population based on the 
individual score of each subject from the questions asked in each section: 
 
( Key: SE - Selective Exposure, BO - Lenient score of Belief Overkill, BO5 - Strict score of 
Belief Overkill, BA - Biased Assimilation, SD – Standard Deviation)  
 
Section  Summary Median   Mean. SD 
A SE    0.0000   0.1364   -0.17 
B BO (lenient) 0.4286   0.4424   -0.13 
B BO5 (strict)   0.2857   0.2870   -0.14 
C BA 0.8125   0.7727 -0.26 
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Results 1 
Given this data, to identify if the biases were positively correlated, as logic would dictate they 
should be, the following table was produced using Pearson's product-moment correlation, to 
measure the strength of linear dependence between two variables.  
 
( Key: SE - Selective Exposure, BO - Lenient score of Belief Overkill, BO5 - Strict score of 
Belief Overkill, BA - Biased Assimilation, cor - Correlation)  
 
> cor(cbind(BO5,BO,SE,BA)) 
 
 BO5    BO SE         BA 
BO5 1.0000000    
BO 0.7539189 1.0000000   
SE 0.2017670 0.1877821 1.0000000  
BA 0.3191498 0.5100685 0.1872092 1.0000000 
 
All correlations were across subjects, so the N is 110. All results were significant at p<.05 
and positive, though the correlation values were smaller than anticipated.  
 
Given these results, we can identify from all three measures a general tendency toward my-
side bias within the Ghanaian population.  
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Results 2 
To identify the overall strength of a party bias, all bias scores that revealed a preference for one 
party were deducted from bias scores that showed a dislike of that same party. Then the obtained 
figure was correlated with the overall biases expressed.  
 
 (Key: (SE - Selective Exposure, BO5 - Strict score of Belief Overkill, BA - Biased 
Assimilation) 
Bias <- scale(BA)+scale(BO5)+scale(SE)  
The overall Bias measure is the sum of the standardized measures on the 3 components.  The 
“scale” takes each of the 3 scores and subtracts from it the mean of that score across subjects, 
then divides by the standard deviation, the s.d..  This way, the three components are weighed 
equally. 
 
Strict Preference Score NPP <- Mean Pro-NPP bias scores - Mean Con-NPP bias scores 
Strict Preference Score NDC <- Mean Pro-NDC bias scores - Mean Con-NDC bias scores 
Strict Preference Score Party <- Strict Preference Score NPP- Strict Preference Score NDC  
This is a measure of bias towards the NPP and away from NDC.) 
 
Using Pearson's product-moment correlation, correlating Bias and Strict Party Preference Score, 
we found a correlation of 0.24 across the 110 subjects. The p-value was equal to 0.0123 with a 
95 percent confidence interval set at 0.053, and hence we found the correlation to be significant.   
 
This tells us that those who strongly favor one party are more biased. Hence, one can 
assume polarization given this expressed preference for one party over the other.  
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Results 3 
To Identify if polarization existed within the views of the electorate, we plotted strict party 
preference results for both parties. Polarization in the electorate would mean that people favor 
one party or the other, with nobody in the middle.  The more standard political-science 
assumption is that most people are in the middle and not at the extremes of a political spectrum. 
Results of preference/dislike shown toward both parties are graphed below: 
 
(Key: plot( Strict Preference Score NPP, Strict Preference Score NDC) 
Strict Preference Score NPP <- Mean Pro-NPP bais scores - Mean Con-NPP bais scores 
Strict Preference Score NDC <- Mean Pro-NDC bais scores - Mean Con-NDC bais scores 
Each score is the mean of the pro-party bias minus the mean of the con-party bias. 
 
Note that this analysis uses all biases expressed, hence the lenient, not strict, belief overkill 
measures (B.O) omitted in other analyses) 
 
 
 
Here, we identify a negative correlation in party preference of -.79. Given such a high 
correlation, a significance test is rendered unnecessary.  Hence, we note significant 
polarization in the view of the electorates. 
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Results 4 
To identify the strength of opposing preferences in party-oriented biases, specific correlations 
between Pro-NDC biases-Con NPP biases, and Con-NDC biases- Pro-NPP biases were graphed. 
In doing this, we derived an overall consistency score for each of the two main parties by using 
all the data, without eliminating any items.  The NPP-consistency score was the sum of all 
responses favoring the NPP or opposing the NDC, divided by the sum of all responses.  Thus it 
would be 1.0 if all responses were on the side of the NPP or against the NDC.  The NDC-
consistency score was the found in the same way, with parties reversed.  
 
(Note that this analysis uses all biases expressed, hence the lenient, not strict, belief overkill 
measures (B.O) omitted in other analyses) 
 
Here, we note relatively few extremists on either end of the spectrum, but clear preferences 
for the majority of the populace in favoring one party over another. Interesting to note 
27.27% of respondents fell in the middle ground, consistent with the belief that 20-40% of 
the populations are swing voters (individuals who hold no party loyalties). 
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Result 5 
To test the correlation between strength of biases against party affiliation (neutral scores counted 
to determine affiliation), another graph was drawn. We defined "Side" as the difference between 
the two consistency scores.  It could range from 1 (totally on the NPP side) to -1 totally on the 
NDC side). The graph shows the mean bias measure as a function of Side, with each point being 
a subject: 
 
  
 
The curve is the best fitting quadratic function (3.7*(Side^2) -.5).  Here, we find that those 
who held the strongest biases, showed stronger party affiliation i.e. they showed a strong 
preference towards their party and a strong dislike towards its opposition. 
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Result 6 
The correlations between subject‟s demographics and biased results were examined: 
 
Occupation was first examined. Individuals were divided into three categories based on how 
much education their occupation indicated and were given a corresponding score: 
 
University level subjects received a score of two and included the following occupations: Student, 
Banker, Businessman/woman, Assistant, Officer, Accountant, Nurse, Manager, Scientist, Doctor, and 
Cosmetologist.  
 
Secondary/Tertiary level subjects received a score of one and included the following occupations: Trader, 
Kente-weaver, Secretary, Electrician, Wholesaler, and Carpenter. 
 
Junior High level subjects received a score of zero and included the following occupations: Gardener, 
Footballer, Driver, Security guard, Cook, and Farmer. 
 
These occupations were then correlated with Bias to identify any existing effect on Party preference 
shown. Using Pearson's product-moment correlation, correlating Bias and Occupation, we found 
a correlation of -0.14 across the 110 subjects. The p-value was equal to 0.015 with a 95 percent 
confidence interval set between -0.318 and 0.0494. 
 
Here we found occupation correlated non-significantly with bias, though subjects in 
occupations needing more education showed less bias. 
 
A correlation of Age and bias was also conducted. Using Pearson's product-moment correlation, 
correlating Bias and Occupation, we found a correlation of 0.028 across the 110 subjects. The p-
value was equal to 0.776 with a 95 percent confidence interval set between -0.164 and 0.218.  
 
The correlation was not statistically significant and showed Age to have no effect on bias. 
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Result 7 
To examine the effects of party orientation, taking into consideration occupation, the following 
analysis was conducted: 
 
Call: 
lm(formula = Bias ~ Occ + m6party) 
 
Residuals: 
  Min    1Q  Median    3Q Max 
-5.0916 -1.5189 0.0852 1.4017 4.7588 
 
Coefficients: 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept)   0.4934   0.4540   1.087   0.2795 
Occ   -0.4053     0.2952 -1.373   0.1727 
m6party 0.3032   0.1218   2.488   0.0144 * 
 
 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 „***‟ 0.001 „**‟ 0.01 „*‟ 0.05 „.‟ 0.1 „ ‟ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 2.042 on 107 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.07299,   Adjusted R-squared: 0.05567 
F-statistic: 4.213 on 2 and 107 DF,  p-value: 0.01734 
 
Here we found the effects of party are still highly significant even after including 
occupation in the regression. 
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Results 8 
 
To determine if there was a correlation between Ethnicity and Party preference, an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted to observe the variance in a particular variable as partitioned 
into components attributable to different sources of variation. ANOVA provides a statistical test 
of whether or not the means of several groups are all equal, and therefore generalizes t-test to 
more than two groups. 
 
(Key: Eth - Ethnicity) 
First we asked if Side depends on Eth: 
anova(aov(Side ~ Eth)) 
Analysis of Variance Table 
Response: Side                 
Df   Sum Sq Mean Sq F value   Pr(>F) 
Eth 5 1.3691 0.27381   2.1211 0.07002 
Residuals 90 11.6180 0.12909 
 
Here we found that ethnicity barely correlates with the strength of party preference by 
analysis of variance. This, however, only reflects that the differences between ethnic groups are 
not extreme i.e. it is not the case that all Akans strongly favor the NPP while all Northerners 
strongly favor the NDC, with no one coming near the middle; there are individuals from every 
group near the middle, even if on different sides. As such, it is not significance that matters in this 
test, but rather the apparent size of the ethnic differences, as we can see in the box-plot below: 
   
49 
 
The width of each box is proportional to the number of subjects.  The heavy line is the median.  
The top and bottom are the first and third quartile (25th and 75th percentile) cutoffs. The 
whiskers "extend to the most extreme data point which is no more than 1.5 times the length of 
the box away from the box. One point is an outlier, which is outside the whisker interval. 
Here we find that the median political preference for each ethnic group falls in line with our 
predicted expectation. That is to say,  
 
Ethnicity Election results : 
      
ANOVA 
Median 
(strength of 
preference for 
NPP over NDC) 
Meanings 
(Comparison of Anova Median with 
election results) 
Parl. 
Const.   
Pres. 
Indiv. 
Akan 75%  
(NPP) 
57.5%(NPP) 3.2 A positive correlation with strength of 
preference for the NPP as expected, and 
correlating with election results (further 
explanation in knowledge review and 
Appendix B). 
Ashanti 92.3% 
(NPP) 
86%(NPP) 3.6 A positive correlation with strength of 
preference for the NPP as expected, and 
correlating with election results (further 
explanation in knowledge review and 
Appendix B). 
Ewe 100% 
(NDC) 
86% (NDC) -2.6 A negative correlation with strength of 
preference for the NPP as expected, and 
correlating with election results (further 
explanation in knowledge review and 
Appendix B). 
Fante 68% 
(NDC) 
53.8%(NDC
) 
1.2 A negative correlation with strength of 
preference for the NPP. This is an unexpected 
result; nonetheless, one never knows what to 
expect (further explanation in knowledge 
review and Appendix B). 
Ga 63% 
(NDC) 
54.4% 
(NDC) 
-1.2 A negative correlation with strength of 
preference for the NPP as expected, and 
correlating with election results (further 
explanation in Appendix B). 
Northern
er 
80% 
(NDC) 
63.1% 
(NDC) 
-1.2 A negative positive correlation with strength 
of preference for the NPP as expected, and 
correlating with election results (further 
explanation in knowledge review and 
Appendix B). 
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In this way, we find that though ANOVA results do not show a large significant correlation 
between Ethnicity and strength of party preference, we see that individuals, given their 
ethnicity, fall along the political party preference spectrum in the anticipated pattern.  
   
Given this, using a direct comparison, we evaluate the strength of preference for political parties 
between the Ashanti‟s/the Akans responses and that of the Ewe/the Northerners, to see if the two 
ethnicities are polarized between themselves. 
 
 A t test comparing the Ashanti‟s/the Akans responses and that of the Ewe/the Northerners was 
significant at t[64] = 2.74, with p=.0079. 
 
This provides evidence for the divide between these ethnic groups in their preference for 
the two competing major parties. That is to say, even if the rest of the ethnic groups fail to 
show clear preference for one of the major parties, these two groupings do and oppose each 
other in their preference.   
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Section D results 
 
1) Do “more and more voters look beyond tribe” in choosing a president? Yes or no? 
 45 - no 
 65 - yes 
 
It is the case that while 41% of the population felt that the country still fell prey to 
ethnocentrism, the remaining 59% believed that the country was progressing and leaving 
‘bad habits’ behind.  This idea of progress can be seen in the wide range of answers given 
by different subjects of different ethnic groups (result 8, see box chart above), despite the 
anticipated biased result. Nonetheless, it is the case that the median subject fell exactly as 
expected on a biased scale in the right direction (supporting the anticipated party for that 
ethnic grouping); this result then is an adequate reflection of the small steps the country is 
making in the right direction, given the beliefs of the populace, despite stubbornness on a 
good number of peoples part. 
  
2)“The 2008 elections, the Ashanti region voted 72.4% in favor of NPP‟s Nana Akufo-Addo 
while the Volta region voted 82.9% in favor NDC‟s John Atta-Mills.” Do these figures support 
the idea that “more and more voter‟s look beyond tribe” in choosing a president? Yes or no? 
61 - no 
47 - yes  
2 - no answer 
 
This question was to test the strength of the belief of individuals given the first question, 
with evidence that seemed to imply existing ethnocentrism. Given this, 1.7% of the 
population who denied ethnocentrism in the beginning admitted to some level of 
ethnocentrism within the country. 55.5% of the population stood fast to their belief, 
qualifying this case as an ‘exception,’ with another 1.7%, giving no answer.  
 
3i) Do you agree or disagree that Ghanaians tend to politicize every issue? 
16 - no 
94 - yes 
 
Here we find that 85.5% of the population believed that issues facing the country were 
often skewed in a political light i.e. the responsibility was often accorded to parties, and not 
observed objectively. The remaining 14.5% of the population thought this was not the case, 
with some giving the explanation that it was the politicians that politicized the issues and 
not the people.  
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3ii) Do you agree or disagree that they fail to take an objective analysis (biased along party lines) 
as to what is appropriate when? 
27 - no 
81 - yes  
  
Interestingly, 73.6% of the population believed that individuals were biased in relation to 
their party preference, with 26.4% disagreeing. Like the consistency found in the support 
for an ethnic bias between belief and results, the belief in the existence of a party bias is 
consistent with result 2 and 3; here, we identified 72.7% of the population expressing clear 
party orientation, and displaying polarization: a like of one party and a dislike of the other. 
Given these party preferences, we find that individuals are consistent in belief and action 
i.e. they are skewed towards their party/subjective opinions, as opposed to objectively 
analysing the issues at hand. 
   
4i) Do you agree or disagree that a radical change in the mindset of the people is needed? 
4 - no 
106 - yes 
 
Here 96.4% of the population believed that a change was needed in the mindset of the 
Ghanaian population. This is consistent with the idea that  85.5% of the population display 
a politically oriented bias, and 41% of the population vote with ethnicity in mind. 
  
4ii) Do you agree or disagree that Ghana has to come first? 
 4 - no 
106 - yes 
 
96.4% of the population said Ghana should come first.  
 
5) When a person votes in an election, what should he or she think about? What is best for the 
nation as a whole, ethnic group, and/or person‟s self-interest? 
 
101 - Nation 
9 - Self-interest 
0 - Ethnic group 
 
Contrary to what one would predict in a clientelist state, only 8.2% believed that voting in 
an election would help fulfill some self-interested goal. Individuals were of the perspective 
that the Nation is what is most important to consider when voting. In generalizing these 
results, we find there is an inherent contradiction with the expressed beliefs by 85.5% of 
the population that individuals display a politically oriented bias and 41% of the 
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population vote with ethnicity in mind (Section D question 1 and 3b). One would expect 
objective analysis of political parties and policies if the Nation was the forefront of one’s 
concern, with no political or ethnic bias factoring into one’s consideration (given that the 
reasons presented for such biases in the political and historical review have nothing to do 
with the good of the nation). Here we find the figures are mismatched; a possible case of a 
Bias Blind-spot, with individuals identifying biases in everyone but themselves.  This result, 
however, is consistent with the 96.4% expressed belief that Ghana should come first in 
individuals thinking (Section D question 4).  
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Discussion 
 
Given the results above, we can attempt to answer many of the questions this research sought to 
explain with regards to the failure of traditional political science models to explain the Ghanaian 
situation in the 2008 elections, in light of the assumed distribution of voters along the linear 
political scale: amassed bimodally at the extreme of the political spectrum.  
Firstly, we analyze the distribution of biases/preference for parties found in the research, and this  
tell us that, though there exists a polarized state, with a population amassed bimodally away from 
the center, the population does not rest on the extremes of the political spectrum. The graph is 
shown below:  
 
 
The left graph (obtained from results 4) shows the distribution of preferences among the subjects 
examined along the political spectrum. Here, we found an “m” shaped pattern that, unlike the 
“U” hypothesis shown to the right, tells us that the middle ground is not completely deserted in 
the Ghanaian political spectrum; there exist those crucial middle-of-the-road voters for which 
politicians would seek to centralize their policies to win over. Furthermore, the 'm' shaped 
pattern tells us that, though there are extremist on each end of the political spectrum, they do not 
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make up the vast majority of the voters; in fact,  like the "inverted U" hypothesis, though less 
acute, extremists make up the minority in the population. Hence, we identified that the majority 
of Ghanaian voters rest equidistant from the center, falling exactly in line with their party 
politicians: moderate in their opposing views. The implications of this on earlier noted problems 
are detailed below. 
 
Given the expectations of the Smithies model (2008) (see Appendix D), one would anticipate 
that extremists would choose to abstain from the political process rather than participate in 
elections, as they would be too disgusted at parties compromising on their policies, thereby 
forcing politicians to keep away from the center. Rather, we saw a good turnout of the voting 
population at elections, and this was contrary to our expectation. Given this new model, we find 
that there exist a relatively small extremist population, and as such, it is plausible that they did 
abstain from the election completely and we didn‟t miss them. They could be accounted for in 
the 27.1%
31
 of the population that did not turn out to vote. Given this situation, it is not odd that 
parties moved towards the center on policy issues to capture a larger proportion of the vote, 
rather than keep to their divergent ideologies.  
 
Our basic assumption was hinged on the fact that there was a high level of tension within the 
populace when the announcement of results was to be proclaimed. Hence, this threat of 
revolution, hinted at a dangerous kind of polarization of the populace, and yet we saw the 
continuance of democratic rule. The explanation for this, we can now say, is that there were far 
too few extremists to actually disrupt the political mechanism. The number of individuals who 
turned up with arms at the Electoral Commission in Accra, or those who barricaded the Radio 
Gold Station, or those who carried weapons and harassed voters during the election, all 
numbered too few to effectively force the country into civil strife over such close election results. 
It could have happened if the majority were pushed further from the center and a little more out 
towards the edges of the political spectrum, but this was not the case. As such, though 49.77% of 
the voting population was disappointed with the government that came to power, they were not 
                                               
31
Figure deduced from Ephson, Ben, Ben Ephson on the 2008 Elections, Media Graphics & Press Limited, Accra, 
2009 
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so disappointed by this outcome that the new opposition could actively encourage revolt; the 
majority does not rest far enough from the center to attain such results.  
 
Another argument for the lack of revolution could be presented: the passivity/apathy of the 
Ghanaian population. Youry Petchenkine (1993) tells us in „Ghana: In search of Stability‟ that, 
as a result of the weak connection made between voting and subsequent government policies, the 
Ghanaian population is passive. It is the case that after general elections, relations between 
candidates and the people who had voted for them disappears; MPs are little concerned with their 
election pledges but rather focused on amassing personal fortunes and as such, ignore their 
supporters. This leads the average Ghanaian to become indifferent to the elections.
32
 This is to 
say, rather than looking at the extremist for a source of revolution, we could look to the general 
populace who were to apathetic with government to become the platform of the revolution. 
Regardless of who won, individuals expected that their government to disappear from their day-
to-day relations in time, and as such, were not willing to sacrifice their lives in a revolution. 
Though this argument could apply to the 27.27% (see results 4:  35% by Ephson) identified 
swing voters within the country, it would not apply to the remaining 72.73%  (65% by Ephson) 
of the population who displayed clear party preferences and loyalties. Nonetheless, this 
argument, in combination with the argument above, helps us understand why we saw the 
continuation of peaceful democratic rule.  
 
Nonetheless, regarding the class distribution of voters along the political scale with a majority 
lower class and a minority upper class that would predict the installation of a left wing 
government, and the bare victory of .23% that the NDC government (left) received, we find party 
preference to be the main cause. As results 6 and 8 show, there is no correlation between 
occupation (a determinant of class) and bais/party preferences shown, rather there is a highly 
significant effect of the party, even when occupation is added to the regression. Thus there are 
probably other factors that promulgate the support of the party, of which occupation is not one. 
So despite there being a large population of lower class individuals within the country, it is the 
case that income/occupation does not figure into the political decisions of voters, but rather the 
party itself. Here, we can recall the historical ethnic and political biases (see knowledge review) 
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associated with each party as a reason by which the population supports a party and is kept on 
opposite sides of the political spectrum. 
 
Following from this, when we note that 20-40% of voters (27.27% identified in our research, see 
result 4) are identified as floating voters (voters with no party loyalties), leaving 80-60% 
(73.74%) of voters as loyalist, we can ask the reason for this persistence. Though biases help us 
identify who will support what and why, it does not tell us why individuals continue to support 
the same parties even when parties apparently fail to keep to their promises and greatly 
ameliorate the living conditions of the majority of the populace. Robert Jervis tells that if “ (the 
politician) undertakes an exchange in which he (the politician) gives the actor (the populace) 
more than he (the politician) needs to and / or receives less than he (the politician) has the power 
to exact, the actor (the populace) is likely to conclude that the other(the politician) has a positive 
stake in his well-being. He (the populace) may believe that the other(the politician) cares about 
him for intrinsic reasons (altruism)”33  Now recall Ghanaians work in a clientelist state (see 
knowledge review) and as such do not hold many expectations for their government. They 
expect them to be corrupt and think only of their pockets, while giving them the least of the least 
on a basis of whom they are and where they come from. So in a situation whereby those in 
government do not keep everything to themselves, and allow some of the benefits of the state to 
affect those areas that serve as its clientele, we find that the populace comes to believe that their 
politicians do care about them, in not withholding everything from them (though we could argue 
that the populace should care about what is withheld and not what is given). In giving back in 
little pieces, the government manages to secure a level of loyalty from the populace, who accepts 
the little given as concern over their well-being for intrinsic reasons. In this way, specific ties of 
affection or general belief that one helps others, or even that the politician is guided by 
instrumental calculations, taking into consideration the important long-run interests in common, 
allow the populace to infer that the politicians behavior did not depend on conditions that are 
likely to change quickly, and so they will continue to expect friendly behavior from politicians in 
the future, and continue to lend them their support.  
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At this point, we can ask of the possibility of eradicating these political biases to allow for a 
more democratic system of government, were policy is the actual decider of votes. The existence 
of floating voters leads one to believe in the possibility, unless we temper this expectation with 
the belief that many of these voters come from regions that have no strong ethnic or political 
historic ties with any of the existing parties. This situation seems dimmer when we take into 
consideration that age has no correlation with bias (see result 7). That is to say, the youth is not 
growing out of the biases left by their predecessors and continue to choose along a party 
preference lines. Moreover, from section D results, we can identify a bias blind-spot, which 
prevents individuals from acknowledging their own biased preferences. That is to say, while 
91.8% of subjects professed that the nation came first when they voted in election (Sec.D, Q.5), 
85.5% (Sec.D, Q.3i) of the population believed Ghanaians in general to display a politically 
oriented bias. The math would show that there is an inherent contradiction in the logic of the 
figures above. Some individuals, though professing to be behind the nation, must be politically 
biased without objectively noting so. And if one cannot identify the problem to begin with, then 
there is one cannot begin to correct the problem. These results thereby predict that these 
politically oriented biases are here to stay. Nevertheless, it was the case that 59% of the 
population believed that the country was progressing and leaving ethnic biases behind, with only 
55.5% regarding the most objectively biased regions as „exceptions‟ to the rule (Sec.D, Q1&2). 
This result is more consistent with the view that 91.8% of subjects believed the nation to come 
first in their thinking. So despite all, we still hope for progress.   
 
Nonetheless, the very work of this paper dims the prospects of seeing change anytime soon. The 
existence of political bias was found using methods that have been found to be mechanisms of 
attitude preservation. That is to say, the research sought to find out if individuals would fail to 
see that new information might contradict beliefs; it examined if information seen as discrepant 
to an individual had its validity explicitly rejected; it noted if individuals discredited the source 
in denying information presented; it observed if individuals attempted to preserve old beliefs by 
admitting puzzlement with what they had heard; and if individuals, presented with information 
they could not discredit, bolstered their own views to decrease the impact of the information 
presented. In this way, the research, in identifying biases among the population, by noting any of 
the above mentioned tendencies with regards to selective exposure, belief overkill and biased 
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assimilation, innately noted the mechanisms by which the population maintained their biased 
beliefs. Having undermined the information presented to them in the course of the research, 
searching for weaknesses to devalue opposing claims, and presenting significant bias scores, we 
find that the population is less likely to lose their biases, given the active engagement of 
mechanisms that preserve belief. Ghanaians, then, could be accused of self-deception and 
manipulation of their beliefs in order to maintain their pre-established politically biased beliefs, 
impeding the change we would like to see. 
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Conclusion 
 
Robert Jervis in his work, „Perception and Misperception in International politics,‟ tells us that 
“Perceptions of the world and of other actors diverge from reality in patterns that we can detect 
and for reasons we can understand (Jervis, 1976).” The basis on which we would establish this 
divergence is through identification of wishful thing, defense mechanisms and other motivated 
distortions of reality. It is these motivated biases that lead individuals to draw inferences from 
highly ambiguous evidence in a confusing and confused setting. In looking at the Ghanaian 
political system from a historical and ethnic view point we can identify why people vote the way 
they do. One would expect that if individuals were to become fully aware of the corruption and 
excesses of the state, then, despite their historical or ethnic ties, they would abandon their loyalty 
to one party for another. Nonetheless, this is not always the case. Though 20-40% of individuals 
may be identified as floating voters (individuals with no party loyalties), it appears that the 
remaining 60-80% are stuck in their ways. In this paper I have presented evidence that it is the 
case that many of the populace hold biases which affect the manner in which they vote. These 
biases when identified, allowed us to see the polarized nature of the populace, with a -.79 (see 
results 3) correlation in the views of supporters and opponents. Nonetheless, unlike previously 
assumed, we found that there does exist a good number of individuals who occupy the middle 
ground and few extremists at the endpoints of the political spectrum, thus allaying our fears that 
revolution could result from the existing polarization identified. Nonetheless, we find that the 
biases identified do not bode well for changes in the political mindset of the Ghanaian populace 
anytime soon, as they reflect in themselves mechanisms by which these pre-existing beliefs are 
maintained.  
 
Nonetheless, in searching for progress, we can examine results produced by this study with the 
observations noted by Youry Petchenkine in his work on Ghana in 1993. Petchenkine noted that 
the rather passive attitude of Ghanaians to general elections largely reflected the low level of 
political consciousness and the inability to understand the fine points of political struggle.  It was 
the case that most voters found it difficult to understand the different party platforms, given that 
some planks were confusing or very similar, while others did not care, and voted based on tribal 
or religious affiliations of the candidate. These they found to be more important than the 
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candidates politics. Moreover, all parties that won generally in the past had broken their election 
promises, not leading to a build of trust within the population. He concluded that it was not odd 
to see parties acting on policies counter to the party manifesto.
34
 Many of the points noted 
continue to be seen today, though one may question the claim that there is “a low level of 
political consciousness and an inabilitlity to understand the fine points of political struggle.” As 
we have discussed throughout this writing, the western sense of the „political‟ and „democracy,‟ 
is not the politics and democracy operating within Ghana today. Like many other African 
countries, many Ghanaian identify clientelism as the politics and corruption as democracy. It is 
not that there is a “low level of political consciousness,” but rather a coherent understanding of 
the political system that individuals operate in. What would be the purpose of voting objectively, 
if one was convinced that party members would only cater to their clientele: one which they did 
not fall into? Individuals, if not apathetic to the political process in general, seek to ensure that 
their best interest are secure; though denied by the 91.8% of subjects (Sec.D, Q.5) we find their 
own, 85.5% (Sec.D, Q.3i), contradicting viewpoint that the population in politically biased (a 
case of a bias blind-spot). If it could be made so that the systems were changed, that clientelism 
was erased and true democracy installed in its place, then we would have a basis on which to 
judge the political consciousness of the Ghanaian people.  
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Recommendation 
A number thing could be done to improve the work conducted and examined in this thesis. 
Primarily with regard to the research conducted in Ghana, the questionnaire used could be 
improved such that the biases sought are more clearly identified. In the research, the line 
between the objective and subjective truth was blurred in many instances, by the nature of the 
questions asked. More refined and carefully chosen questions would resolve this problem. 
Moreover, in finding more factual evidence on activities of political parties, the bias of belief 
overkill could be made more accurate.  
 
In the scoring of research questions, rather than basic yes or no questions, scales of 1-100 could 
be used to find out just how much each individual falls prey to any kind of bias, especially with 
belief overkill. For example, a response such as 65% false would reveal less of a bias than a 95% 
false answer. This would help fine tune bias scores.  
 
One problem that the research fell prey to, which could be anticipated in a re-construction of this 
test, is outcome bias. Subjects tend to look at past government actions in analyzing manifesto‟s 
and promises made by candidates. This may seem appropriate and rational in real life, but 
derogatory when seeking to isolate belief overkill or biased assimilation/polarization biases in 
the research. For example a question with a prompt like, “The (NDC) government has said time and 
again that it cannot sit down unconcerned while its citizens suffer so far as something could be done to 
either reduce or remove the suffering of the people;” and the question “Do you believe that the NDC 
government main concern is the suffering of the people?” Individuals tended to answer first with 
reference to the past performance of government, in saying, “o, look at how they‟ve increased fuel 
prices,” or conversely, “look at how they‟ve reduced the TOR debt” in answering the question, rather than 
taking the question itself at face value. Questions that can avoid such outcome bias approaches 
would provide more accurate figures of bias.  
 
In addition, the research should be conducted on a broader scale to involve more regions within 
the country and a larger subject body. In this way, the research would provide a broader 
perspective of the happenings within the country and the biases expressed in the population 
across Ghana as a whole. 
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Appendix A 
 
Detailed Analysis of Questionnaire 
 
Section A – Selective Exposure 
1) Which Radio Stations do you prefer in this selection? 
8. Joy FM - Neutral 
9. Radio Gold - NDC 
10. Peace FM -  NPP 
11. Choice FM - NPP 
12. Other –  Neutral/NDC/NPP - Usually resulted in Neutral responses 
2) Which News Paper do you prefer in this selection? 
● Daily Guide - NPP 
● Daily Graphic - Neutral 
● The New Crusading Guide - NPP 
● The Heritage - NDC 
● The Ghanaian Observer - NPP  
● The Crystal Clear Lens - NDC 
● The Daily Post - NDC 
● The Ghanaian Times - Neutral 
● The Enquirer - NDC 
● The Chronicle - NPP 
● Other - Neutral/NDC/NPP - Usually resulted in Neutral responses 
3) Which Television Station do you prefer in this selection? 
2. Ghana Television (GTV) - Neutral 
3.  TV3 - Neutral 
4. Metro Television - Neutral 
5. Net2 - NPP 
6. Other - Neutral/NDC/NPP - Usually resulted in Neutral responses 
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Section B – Views on Facts and Objective Beliefs (Belief Overkill) 
NB: for all questions, “I do not know” counts as an answer. Try to get people to comment. 
2.The NPP after the 2000 election  
A) The NPP had the vision to repeat the call to peace, reconciliation and unity by setting up the National 
Reconciliation Commission   
2. Do you believe the NPP had this goal in mind? 
Possible Responses + explanations - Expectations 
Yes - Neutral 
Yes - They wanted to help people/Ghana (BO lenient- Pro NPP) 
No - Against NPP (BO5 strict – Con NPP) 
No - This was specifically aimed at hurting their opponents/they wanted political points - Against NPP 
(BO5 strict – Con NPP) 
Probably (Hesitancy) - Neutral 
Two Diverging Answers - Neutral 
 
B) The goal of the National Reconciliation Commission was in confronting the painful truths about the 
hurts and injustices of the years of political upheaval and lawlessness that Ghana will forgive and be 
reconciled  
● Do you or do you not share/believe in this goal? 
Yes – Neutral 
Yes - They wanted to help people/Ghana (BO lenient- Pro NPP) 
No – Against NPP (BO5 strict – Con NPP) 
No - Talking as therapy doesn't work – neutral because objective reasoning in place 
Yes - People feel satisfaction after being heard – neutral because objective reasoning in place 
 
C) In An agenda for positive change, the NPP promised to the people of Ghana "a change that will be 
reflected in a lowering of the intolerably high cost of living and a reduction in the depressingly high rate 
of unemployment, a change that will bring jobs and a living wage for the majority of our people …" 
● Do you believe that the NPP had this goal for Ghana? 
(An outcome bias was noted for this question, as many people wanted to refer backwards in making 
judgments on this question, and though encouraged not to, it was still reflected more often than not in 
their answers.) 
Yes – Neutral 
Yes – they wanted to benefit the community – (BO lenient- Pro NPP) 
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No – Against NPP (BO5 strict – Con NPP) 
No - they only came for money – Against NPP (BO5 strict – Con NPP) 
 
 
3. The AFRC in 1979 (became the PNDC, then the NDC)  
A) The AFRC followed the creed that "people dealing with the public, in whatever capacity, are subject 
good of the community above personal objective,"  
I. Do you believe the AFRC had this creed? 
Yes – Neutral 
Yes, qualified with affirmative reasoning – For the NDC (BO lenient– Pro-NDC) 
No – Against NDC (BO5 strict – Con NDC) 
II. Do you or do you not share this creed? 
Yes – Neutral  
No – Against the NDC (BO5 strict – Con NDC) 
No – Neutral if objective reasoning is given 
 
B) The AFRC engaged in a coup d‟etat which overthrew the ruling government in 1979. The coup 
resulted in the subsequent executions of former heads of military governments, thought to be corrupt. 
● Do you or do you not commend this action? 
Unnecessary – Against the NDC (BO5 strict – Con NDC) 
Bad – Against the NDC (BO5 strict – Con NDC), Neutral if qualified by objective reasoning 
Good – For the NDC (BO lenient- Pro NDC) 
 
 4.Then 2000 Presidential Elections 
A) “The Ghana Legal Literacy and Resource Foundation, an independent non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) which observed the 2000 general elections, … commended the electoral process and described it 
as "largely free and fair." 
(http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=12513) 
I. Do you agree or disagree that the electoral process was “largely free and fair?” 
Yes – Neutral  
No – Disillusionment if for all three questions or shows a bias expressed in the answering of following 
questions 
II. Do you agree or disagree that the NDC played fair? 
Yes – Pro NDC (BO5 strict – Pro NDC) 
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No – Against NDC  (BO5 strict – Con NDC) 
III. Do you agree or disagree that the NPP played fair? 
Yes – Pro NPP (BO5 strict – Pro NPP) 
No – Against NPP  (BO5 strict – Con NPP) 
 
 5. The 2008 Presidential Elections 
A)“No doubt both NDC and NPP attempted and did rig in this election, but I don‟t believe anyone was 
able to rig enough votes to win.” (http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/54963) 
I. Do you agree or disagree that NDC attempted and/or did rig the election? 
Yes – Against the NDC (BO5 strict – Con NDC), Disillusionment if for both questions 
No – For the NDC (BO5 strict – Pro NDC) 
II. Do you agree or disagree that NPP attempted and/or did rig the election? 
Yes – Against the NPP (BO5 strict – Con NPP), Disillusionment if for both questions 
No – For the NPP (BO5 strict – Pro NPP) 
III. Do you agree or disagree that no one was able to rig enough votes to win? 
Yes – Neutral  
No – Against the NDC (BO5 strict – Con NDC) 
 
Present Day Political News 
6. Ideology – How the parties describe themselves 
A)“The (NDC) government has said time and again that it cannot sit down unconcerned while its citizens 
suffer so far as something could be done to either reduce or remove the suffering of the people.” (The 
Lens)  
● Do you believe that the NDC government main concern is the suffering of the people? 
Yes- Neutral/ For the NDC - (BO lenient- Pro NDC) 
No – Against the NDC (BO5 strict – Con NDC) 
No – Disillusionment if for all four questions 
That‟s what they say - Neutral 
 
B) “According to the former president, the NPP has an enduring tradition; a tradition that will never die; a 
tradition founded on respect for humanity. Our forefathers chose respect for humanity as the corner stone 
of our ideology because we believe the human being is central to everything we do.” (The Heritage)  
● Do you believe that the NPP government main concern is the human being? 
Yes- Neutral/For the NPP (BO lenient- Pro NPP) 
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No – Against the NPP (BO5 strict – Con NPP) 
No – Disillusionment if for all four questions 
That‟s what they say - Neutral 
 
C) “The CPP says it is determined to harness the ideals, energies , creativity, aspiration, hopes and fears 
of the youth to attain political power to guarantee a great future for the young people of the country.” 
(The Heritage)  
● Do you believe that the CPP‟s main concern, if it attains power, is to guarantee a great future of 
young people of the country? 
Yes - Neutral/For the CPP 
No – Against the CPP 
No – Disillusionment if for all four questions 
 That‟s what they say – Neutral 
(Mainly to identify if beliefs extend between major parties) 
 
D) “Spokesman of the PNC said “We look upon Nkurmah/Limann as the foremost patriots and we stretch 
our arms to all Ghanaians especially the youth and women, to join us in our genuine quest for true 
political and economic freedom and justice.” (The New Crusading Guide)  
● Do you believe that the main concern of the PNC is true political and economic freedom and 
justice? 
Yes- Neutral/For the PNC 
No – Against the PNC 
No – Disillusionment if for all four questions 
That‟s what they say - Neutral 
 (Mainly to identify if beliefs extend between major parties) 
 
7. Drugs – Wiki Leaks 
A) A December 2007 cable leaked saying “Embassy contacts in the police service and the president‟s 
office „have said they know the identities of the major barons, but the (NPP) government of Ghana does 
not have the political will to go after them” (The Ghanaian observer)  
I. Do you agree or disagree that the (NPP) government know the identities of major drug barons?  
Yes - Neutral 
Yes - with derogatory affirmation Against NPP (BO lenient- Con NPP) 
No – For the NPP (BO5 strict – Pro NPP) 
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II. Do you agree or disagree that the NPP government lacked the political will to fight the drug 
trade? 
Yes - Neutral 
Yes - with derogatory affirmation Against NPP (BO lenient- Con NPP) 
No – For the NPP (BO5 strict – Pro NPP) 
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Section C – Views on other’s Opinions (not factual, mostly exaggerated) (Baised 
Assimilation/Polarization) 
NB: for all questions, “I do not know” counts as an answer. Try to get people to comment. 
1. Performance 
A) “The CPP Party Director of Communications believes … that the NDC or NPP … have failed to 
transform the country from the two decades that they have taken turns to run the affairs of the country. 
While admitting that the election 2012 will be difficult for the CPP, he said it will be more difficult for 
the NDC and NPP whose record of bad governance cannot support any arguments for continuity. He said 
the CPP was poised to bring the change that the youth and nation needed, and will spare no effort to attain 
that goal” (The Heritage)  
I. Do you believe or disbelieve that the NDC has failed to transform the country in the two decades 
that it has taken turns to run the affairs of the country? 
Yes – Against the NDC (Con-NDC) 
No – For the NDC (Pro-NDC) 
They did better than the alternative – For the NDC (Pro-NDC) 
They did okay – Neutral  
II. Do you believe or disbelieve that the NPP has failed to transform the country in the two decades 
that it has taken turns to run the affairs of the country? 
Yes – Against the NPP (Con-NPP) 
No – For the NPP (Pro-NPP) 
They did better than the alternative – For the NPP (Pro-NPP) 
They did okay – Neutral  
III. Do you believe or disbelieve that the election will be difficult for the CPP? 
Yes/ No – Neutral if objective reasoning is given 
IV. Do you believe or disbelieve that the NDC will suffer more? 
Yes – Against the NDC (Con-NDC) 
No – For the NDC (Pro-NDC) 
Objective reasoning/Unknown – Neutral  
V. Do you believe or disbelieve that the NPP will suffer more? 
Yes – Against the NPP (Con-NPP) 
No – For the NPP (Pro-NPP) 
Objective reasoning/Unknown – Neutral  
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B) “Two year into the administration of President Mills has seen tremendous improvement in the 
economy of this country as the government has been able to achieve what the NPP was unable to achieve 
within the eight years that they were in office.” (The Lens)  
● Do you think this commentator is right? Has Mills brought tremendous improvement to the 
economy of this country? Has he done what the NPP was unable to achieve? 
Yes – For the NDC (Pro-NDC) 
No – Against the NDC (Con-NDC) 
Objective reasoning (the time comparison is unjust) – Neutral  
 
C) “What the NPP must come to terms with is the fact that the good people of Ghana gave them an eight-
year mandate to address the socio-economic challenges confronting them which they failed miserably 
necessitating the NPP being booted out of government” (The Lens)  
● Do you think this commentator is right? Did the NPP fail Ghanaians in their 8 years of power? 
Yes – Against the NPP (Con-NPP) 
No – For the NPP (Pro-NPP) 
Objective reasoning (they tried, they didn‟t fail completely) – Neutral  
 
D) “In 2008, barely two years ago, president Mills took over from former President Kufour a distressed 
economy controlled by reckless spending, heavy national debt, rocketing inflation, high fiscal deficit, 
depleted foreign reserves and rising interest rates. Corruption, drug trafficking, armed robbery and cold 
blooded execution of Mobilla and Ya Naa were the order of the day.” (The Heritage)  
● Do you think this commentator is right? Were these the problems facing Mills when he took 
over? 
Yes – Against the NPP (Con-NPP) 
No – For the NPP (Pro-NPP) 
Objective reasoning (problems not limited to any party) – Neutral 
 
E) “The attorney-general and minster for Justice said it took the NDC government several weeks to solve 
problems NPP left in office... “we had to pay huge debts (incurred) during NPP time, so many contracts 
were abrogated and we had to pay… so we used the first year to understand the problems and find 
solutions to the problems so that we lay foundations in year two so you will see developments in year 
three… about 4000 Ghanaians would be given employment opportunities as contracts will be sub-
contracted to Ghanaians.”  ” she assured.” (The Heritage) 
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● Do you think this commentator is right? Do you believe these are the problems the NDC faced? 
Do you believe that these are the improvements we will see in 2011? 
Yes – For the NDC (Pro-NDC) 
No – Against the NDC (Con-NDC) 
Objective reasoning (we have to wait and see) – Neutral  
 
F) “The attorney-general and minster for Justice, has described as disheartening and disturbing, 
suggestions that the ruling NDC has done nothing since she assumed office two years ago. She says such 
comments are only propagandist tools meant to steal the conscience of the people who are themselves 
witnesses to development projects in their respective districts”(The Heritage)  
● Do you think this commentator is right? Has the NDC done something these 2 years? Are people 
trying to change the minds of Ghanaians who can see the progress happening around them? 
Yes – For the NDC (Pro-NDC) 
No – Against the NDC (Con-NDC) 
Objective reasoning (maybe) – Neutral  
 
H) “According to the former president, the NPP has always occupied a unique position in the nation‟s 
political scheme of affairs, adding “ whenever the people entrust the leadership of the country into our 
hands, the nation prospers, because we believe in using power to serve the people and not to oppress 
them.” (The Heritage) 
● Do you think this commentator is right? Has the nation prospered under the NPP? Have they used 
their power to serve the people? 
Yes – For the NPP (Pro-NPP) 
No – Against the NPP (Con-NPP) 
Objective reasoning (prospered in some way and not in some) – Neutral  
 
2. Event 
B) “The Ledzokuky Constituency of the NPP says an attempt by the ruling NDC to take credit for the 
construction of a 100-bed general hospital at Teshi in Accra to be commissioned shows how desperate the 
NDC has become since assuming office…(The NPP challenged) the NDC.. . to stop throwing dust in the 
eyes of the good people of Teshie”   
● What is your opinion on this story? Do you think it is true or false or somewhere in the middle?  
True – Against the NDC / For the NPP (Con NDC/ Pro NPP)  
False – For the NDC / Against the NPP (Pro NDC/Con NPP) 
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I don‟t know / Middle / Objective reasoning - Neutral 
  
C) “In their bid to rescue one of their own from facing prosecution for smoking and possession of 
marijuana, a known NDC goons quartet in Sankore, a suburb in the Brong Ahafo Region,… broke into 
the Sankore Police Cell to release their pal” (The New Crusading Guide)  
● What is your opinion on this story? Do you think it is true or false or somewhere in the middle?  
True – Against the NDC (Pro-NDC) 
False – For the NDC (Con-NDC) 
I don‟t know / Middle / Objective reasoning - Neutral 
 
3. Drug (Wiki-leaks) 
 A) “Some individuals in the NPP worked systematically to undermine efforts to fight the drug menace 
because of their personal interest” (The Ghanaian observer)  
● Do you think this commentator is right? Did individuals in the NPP refuse to challenge the drug 
menace because of their personal interest? 
True – Against the NPP (Pro-NPP) 
False – For the NPP (Con-NPP) 
I don‟t know / Middle / Objective reasoning - Neutral 
 
C) “The deputy minister of information said that “the NDC government was ready to engage the NPP in 
detailed discussions on the issue of the Wiki-leaks drug trade and asked that the NPP not to be 
“embarrassed by its narcotic records” and dart away from the issue” (The Heritage) 
● What is your opinion on this issue? Is the NDC right to ask the NPP not to run away from this 
issue? 
Yes – For the NDC / Against NPP (Pro NDC/Con NPP) 
No – Against the NDC / For NPP (Con NDC/ Pro NPP) 
I don‟t know / Middle / Objective reasoning - Neutral 
 
4. Opinions 
C) “The NPP does not want the government and for that matter the NDC to succeed so will do 
everything, within its domain to criticize and oppose any good thing that the ruling party might 
introduce”(The Lens)  
● What is your opinion on this issue? Is the NPP trying to stop the NDC from succeeding? 
Yes – For the NDC / Against NPP (Pro NDC/Con NPP) 
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No – Against the NDC / For NPP(Con NDC/ Pro NPP) 
I don‟t know / Objective reasoning (simply politics) - Neutral 
 
 D) “Of late, major opposition parties (NPP) are hitting well below the belt. Is this the result of fear? 
Looking at the excellent performance of Prof. Mills, the gurus of NPP have come to realize that there is 
no way their party can win the 2012 election except through such dirty tricks and strategies” (The 
Heritage) 
● What is your opinion on this issue? Is NPP attacking NDC because of fear of Mills and 2012 
election? 
Yes – For the NDC / Against NPP (Pro NDC/Con NPP) 
No – Against the NDC / For NPP (Con NDC/ Pro NPP) 
I don‟t know / Objective reasoning (simply politics) - Neutral 
 
E) “Indeed, the NPP has an agenda; that is to make the Government unpopular, and eventually to lose 
focus and fail to achieve its target.” (The Heritage)  
● What is your opinion on this issue? Is NPP trying to make NDC unpopular so NDC fails to 
achieve? 
Yes – For the NDC / Against NPP (Pro NDC/Con NPP) 
No – Against the NDC / For NPP (Con NDC/ Pro NPP) 
I don‟t know / Objective reasoning (simply politics) - Neutral 
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Section D – Voting Attitudes and Results 
1) “When it comes to choosing a president, Ghanaians seem to be putting more emphasis on ideas and 
values than in the past. Today, more and more voters look beyond tribe and qualifications in examining 
candidates‟ personal and professional qualities and values.” 
(http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/54963) 
● Do “more and more voters look beyond tribe” in choosing a president? Yes or no? 
Expectations: People would say no, individuals are ethnically minded and this would be compared against 
the results from the questionnaire 
Secondary Research findings: see tables in Appendix B 
 
2)“In the 2008 elections, the Ashanti region voted 72.4% in favor of NPP‟s Nana Akufo-Addo while the 
Volta region voted 82.9% in favor NDC‟s John Atta-Mills. (http://www.ec.gov.gh/node/134) 
● Do these figures support the idea that “more and more voter‟s look beyond tribe” in choosing a 
president? Yes or no? 
Expectations: People would say yes, individuals are ethnically minded and this would be compared 
against the results from the questionnaire 
 
3) “Most Ghanaians are noted to be a group of people who tend to politicize every issue in the country 
without taking an objective analysis as to what is appropriate and what is needed at a particular point in 
time” (The Lens)  
I. Do you agree or disagree that Ghanaians tend to politicize every issue?  
Gage individual opinions: comparison against the results from the questionnaire 
II. Do you agree or disagree that they fail to take an objective analysis as to what is appropriate 
when? 
Gage individual opinions: comparison against the results from the questionnaire 
 
4) “We need a radical paradigm shift of the mindset of the people: An attitudinal change to appreciate and 
contribute positively to the drive for rapid economic emancipation. In all things, Ghana has to come first” 
(The Heritage)  
I. Do you agree or disagree that a radical change in the mindset of the people is needed? 
Gage individual opinions: comparison against the results from the questionnaire 
II. Do you agree or disagree that Ghana has to come first? If not, who should? 
Gage individual opinions: comparison against the results from the questionnaire 
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5) When a person votes in an election, what should he or she think about? What is best for the nation as a 
whole, ethnic group, and/or person‟s self-interest?  
Gage individual opinions: comparison against the results from the questionnaire 
 
 
Section E - (Optional) 
Age: 
Expectations:  
The youth/young adults (19 – 30) should be more objective 
Adults (30 +) should be less objective given they know more of the history of the different parties and 
should have more experience with politics in Ghana in general. 
 
Ethnicity: 
Expectations: 
 Akan‟s would be NPP Pro Biased, 
 Ga‟s, Northerners, and Ewe‟s NDC Pro Biased 
 
Political Party: 
Expectations: Political Party alignment consistent with expressed biases 
 
Occupation: 
Expectations:  
Professional occupations (Doctors, nurses, teachers) should show less biases due to higher education 
Trading occupations (hawkers etc) should show more biases due to less education 
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Score Sheet       File ____  Recording 
____ 
Section  Question  Alphab Roman  NDC Bias  NPP Bias  Other 
Bias 
 Neutral 
A    pro con pro Con pro con  
 1   R/G  P/C     Joy 
 2   H/L/DP/E  GD/CG/GO    GR/GT/ 
 3     N2    T/M/G 
B           
 2          
  A         
  B         
  C         
 3          
  A         
   I        
   II        
  B         
 4          
  A         
   I        
   II        
   III        
 5          
  A         
   I        
   II        
   III        
 6          
  A         
  B         
  C         
  D         
 7          
  A         
   I        
   II        
  B         
C           
 1          
  A         
   I        
   II        
   III        
   IV        
   V        
   VI        
  B         
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  C         
  D         
  E         
  F         
  H         
 2          
  A         
  B         
  C         
 3          
  A         
  B         
  C         
 4          
  A         
  B         
  C         
  D         
  E         
D           
 1          
 2          
 3          
  I         
  II         
 4          
  I         
  II         
 5          
E           
 Age          
 Ethnicity          
 P. Party          
 Occupation          
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Appendix B 
Ghanaian Demographics and 2008 Election Result Table 
 
 
Major peoples: 
 
Akan 35.4% (excluding Fante) 
( Mainly: Ashanti Region, Eastern Region, Partially: Brong-Ahafo Region) 
Fante10.9% 
(Central Region) 
 
Mole-Dagbon 15.2%, 
(Northern Region) 
Ewe 11.7%, 
(Volta Region) 
Ga-Dangme 8.7%, 
(Greater Accra Region) 
 
other 20.4% 
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Region 
(Pop %) 
Ethnicity Party Historical Explanation Pres. 
Election 
Parl. 
Election 
    Indv. Const. 
Ashanti 
18.6% 
Akan NDC No allegiance 14%  
  
NPP Ethnic ties – the leadership of the party is 
composed of mainly Ashanti‟s and other 
Akans 
86% 92.3%  
Eastern 
10.5% 
Akan NDC No allegiance 42.5%  
  
NPP Ethnic ties– the leadership of the party is 
composed of mainly Ashanti‟s and other 
Akans 
57.5% 75% 
Brong-
Ahafo 
Diverged 
9.3% 
Brongs NDC No allegiance/ Alternative Party 51.5%  
  
NPP Ethnic ties – nonetheless, historically, the 
Ashanti‟s in their bid for expansion 
conquered and dominated these lands 
48.5% 63%  
Central 
8.2% 
Swing 
State 
Fante NDC No allegiance / Alternative Party 53.8% 68% 
  
NPP Ethnic ties – nonetheless, historically, the 
Ashanti‟s fought unsuccessfully with the 
Fanti states, leading to their quick alliance 
with the British 
46.2%  
Western  
9.7% 
Swing 
State 
Nzema NDC No allegiance 51.9%  
84 
 
 
Region 
(Pop %) 
Ethnicity Party Historical Explanation Pres. 
Election 
Parl. 
Election 
    Indv. Const 
Volta 
8.1% 
Ewe 
 
  
NDC Ethnic ties – the founder of the party is Ewe 
and Ewe‟s display strong ethnic solidarity 
86% 100%  
  NPP No allegiance 14%  
Upper 
West 
2.6% 
Northners NDC Alternative party 65.6% 80%*  
  
NPP Bad Ethnic relationship – in the past, the 
Ashanti kingdom demanded slaves for the 
new European market, and most of these 
slaves came from now Northern Ghana 
34.4%  
Upper 
East 
4% 
Northners NDC Alternative party 62% 80%*  
  
NPP Bad Ethnic relationship - in the past, the 
Ashanti kingdom demanded slaves for the 
new European market, and most of these 
slaves came from now Northern Ghana 
38%  
Northern 
8.8% 
Northners NDC Alternative party  61.6% 80%* 
  
NPP Bad Ethnic relationship - in the past, the 
Ashanti kingdom demanded slaves for the 
new European market, and most of these 
slaves came from now Northern Ghana 
38.4%  
Greater 
Accra 
10.1% 
Swing 
state 
Ga, others NDC No allegiance – though Ga‟s are known to 
favor this party. 
54.4% 63%  
  NPP No allegiance 45.6%  
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Appendix C 
 
Hotellings Model 
 
A model proposed by H. Hotelling (Economic Journal 39) of the effect of competition on 
locational decisions. The model is usually based on two ice-cream salesmen, A and B, on a mile 
of beach. The cost and choice of ice-cream is the same for each distributor. Buyers are evenly 
distributed along the beach. The first pattern of market share has the two salesmen positioned so 
that each is at the centre of his half of the beach and the market is split up evenly. If A now 
moves nearer to the middle of the beach, he will increase his market share. The logical outcome 
of this will have both salesmen back to back at the centre of the beach, as long as some 
customers are willing to walk nearly half a mile for an ice-cream, i.e. that the consumer provides 
the transport. This analogy indicates that locational decisions are not made independently but are 
influenced by the actions of others. 
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Hotelling model
35
 
 
How did Anthony Downs apply Hotelling's analysis to politics? If there exists only a single 
issue-space, then all political parties have an incentive to move their positions toward those of 
the median voter and to claim that their policies represent the middle range of opinion, while 
characterizing the other side as being to either extreme. It is difficult for third parties to exist in 
this situation, because any side of the issue-space that has more than one party will have all of its 
parties defeated if the other side of the issue-space has only one party.   
 
Smithies Model 
 
Arthur Smithies idea of voter alienation: Voter alienation implies that voters will not vote for a 
party that drifts too far away from their preferences. In an election, people will only vote if the 
marginal benefit to them of voting exceeds the considerable marginal costs of waiting in line and 
foregone time. If a party's principles are no longer appealing to a voter from that party's base, 
                                               
35
 Hotellings Model, Answers.com, Accessed 5/20/2011 <http://www.answers.com/topic/hotelling-
model#ixzz1MvrJZkc2> 
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then that voter will prefer to stay home. This is what has been happening, for instance, with the 
Republican Party in the United States, which has increasingly failed to "get out its base." 
 
Introducing voter alienation changes the outcome of a political process in a single issue-space. In 
a unimodal, symmetric distribution of voters, the two parties will still appeal to the median voter. 
However, if the mode of the distribution is different from the median (i.e., in an asymmetric, 
unimodal distribution), then, as a result of alienation, both parties will drift toward the mode, 
because each will gain more voters from approaching the mode than are lost from alienation. In a 
multimodal distribution, it is possible for each party to try to reach a different mode. In a 
bimodal distribution, for instance, the two major parties might capture each of the modes, 
alienating the voters in between them. There is therefore room for a third party to come in and 
appeal to the voters in the center between the two modes; such a third party might even win the 
election, although this is not a foregone conclusion. This kind of distribution of voters is also 
conducive to parties being substantively different in their positions on the issue. (Wolfram 
(2008))
36
 
 
 
 
                                               
36
 Wolfram, Gary. Lectures on Public Choice Economics. Hillsdale College. Hillsdale, MI. October -November 
2008 in Stolyarov, The Hotelling-Downs and Smithies Models of Voting, Public Choice Economics Study 
Guide, 2008, <http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1194002/the_hotellingdowns_and_smithies_models.html> 
